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Abstract 
 
We analyze the hidden mobilities, in physio-spatial, epistemic and social terms that are part and parcel 
of livelihood strategies in places dominated by informal institutions and authoritarian governance 
regimes. Soviet and post-Soviet Uzbekistan and Tajikistan serve as empirical references to develop the 
theoretical perspective. We link this analysis with an analysis of the roles of boundaries, scales and 
mobilities in general, with special emphasis on the role of formal and informal institutions and on 
networks of mobility. We thus link a Deleuzian-inspired frame with a new institutionalist perspective on 
development and discuss the potential of development interventions to alter rules, roles and routes of 
people and the influence of mobilities, hidden and visible, to alter the effects of development 
(intervention).  
 
Keywords 
mobilities, boundaries, identities, Deleuze, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, development  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we first develop a Deleuzian-inspired conceptual frame to rethink ‘mobilities’, in line with 
recent literature on mobilities in geography and anthropology, and more broadly in line with the 
‘spatial’ and ‘material’ turns in these disciplines, which in many cases, especially in geography, meant an 
exploration of Deleuzian concepts in an attempt to overcome the supposed logo-centrism of 
structuralist and many post-structuralist theories.  
We develop a concept of mobilities that includes physio-spatial, social and epistemic mobilities, 
mobilities that entail the crossing of physio-spatial, social and epistemic boundaries and the reshaping of 
identities. Mobilities can be visible and invisible, and we argue that the difference between visible and 
invisible mobilities has social, economic and political consequences. Invisible mobilities we call hidden 
mobilities. In two countries with an abundance of hidden mobilities, namely Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, 
we investigate the origins of this situation, the functioning of these mobilities and the impact on 
development efforts. 
Thus, we study Uzbek and Tajik rural areas, as places marked by hidden mobilities: forms and sites of 
income generation and wealth creation, status upgrading, travel and migration and the socio-spatial 
networks enabling these mobilities. Uzbek and Tajik rural areas are environments where people move 
physio-spatially and socially, much of it in secrecy. The distrust vis-à-vis government and in formal 
institutions (i.e. laws, policies, plans) created in both areas a predominance of informal institutions. 
Informality here is not a separate world of alternative coordination, but in many cases one deals with 
rules to apply, ignore and enforce the formal rules. This situation both creates mobility, to survive and 
sometimes be successful and it forces much of that mobility to become invisible, as it is either 
technically illegal or legal without trust in legal protection. Furthermore these mobilities are entwined 
with epistemic mobilities and thus with traveling concepts, discourses, narratives (Bal, 2002; Teampau & 
Van Assche, 2009) as the below will illustrate.  
The case analyses serve to develop a conceptual perspective for studying hidden mobilities and to 
explore linkages with an institutionalist perspective on economic development, in line with Douglass 
North, Paul Seabright, Avner Greif and Elinor Ostrom, in which actors and institutions, rules and roles 
are not pre-defined in the history and economic development of an area. Just as with Deleuze and the 
geographers and anthropologists in his wake (often via interpreters as Manuel de Landa) identities are 
formed in history, in contact with other identities, with rules of coordination and with contingent events 
in the environment. Deleuze and the institutionalists do not share the same ontological set of references 
and neither do they share a political ideology or a perspective on scientific methodology. This is not a 
problem, we argue, since no theory is completely consistent and no ontological embedding completely 
accounts for all the other elements of the theory. In other words, critical analysis can reveal the 
consistency of different parts of the theory and evaluate the productive capacity of combinations with 
parts of other theories. This is certainly a Deleuzian exercise (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). The consistency 
sought in this paper is to be found in the domain of the analysis of different types of mobilities and 
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boundaries2 linked to issues of identity and scale, where mobilities can be coupled with analyses of de 
facto versus de jure coordination of actions and transactions, analyses of actor formation, rule of law 
stabilization and economic development, traditional ground for institutional economics. 
 
In order to smoothen the linkage between Deleuze and the institutionalists, in a manner productive for 
the analysis of development efforts, we need to establish a broad enough concept of institutions and 
especially of formal institutions. In a Deleuzian universe, it seems essential to look at the actual forms of 
coordination between actors (and between actors, ideas, rules, material objects). Narrowing this idea 
down, one can say, first, that laws, as formal institutions deemed essential in development efforts 
nowadays, cannot be seen as the only form of formal institutions, and secondly, that the functions of 
law in development should be interpreted broadly, not only as rules that have to be obeyed (while 
sometimes they are not) but also in terms of the multitude of effects they have or, in other words, the 
variety of functions they can be attributed to. These functions of law in development policy we will 
divide in three.   
 
Law for us has several roles in development policy: upholding, delimiting and enabling (Beunen et al., 
2014). Any policy aimed at development, whether emanating from within or from outside a respective 
organizational unit (i.e. organizations, countries, etc.), needs law in these three roles: the policy needs to 
be legal, as in allowed, it needs legal tools for implementation and it will be delimited in implementation 
by other laws. If these three roles are stabilized, it is possible for law to stabilize expectations of various 
actors (Luhmann, 2004), so that legal tools such as contracts become functional (with regard to 
Uzbekistan this is exemplified in Djanibekov et al., 2013). Crystallization of legal rules (institutions) and 
roles (positions in a form of judiciary, positions in economic transactions) is therefore essential for 
economic development (Van Assche et al., 2013c).  
 
This starting point already points at a limitation of development strategies that rely on formal 
institutions: simply introducing new laws, policies and plans is unlikely to succeed if the three functions 
of law are not present and mutually supportive (Ostrom, 2005; Jacobs, 1991). In addition, new formal 
institutions are likely to be subsumed in a network of informality that can render them useless or 
pervert their effects (Hayoz & Giordano, 2013; Easterly, 2006). On the other hand, existing informal 
institutions can also enhance the functioning of law, e.g. in the support of development initiatives 
(Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). And conversely, initiatives that rely on informal institutions entirely are a 
priori vulnerable to erosion by other informalities or by initiatives, internal or external, that invoke the 
authority of formal institutions (de Soto, 2000). Thus, the old exaggerated trust in laws and policies for 
development, and in ‘development’ as the object of social engineering in general, was indeed 
exaggerated but one cannot replace it with full reliance on self-organization and informality (Ferguson, 
1994; Verdery, 2003; Luhmann, 1995).  
If this is the case, it is useful to delineate the functions of law and of informal institutions and, more 
importantly, to grasp their case-specific dialectics. By this we mean the continuous interaction between 
                                                 
2 The use of the plural thus aims to underline the study of different types, rather than indicating the sheer plurality of singular 
events of mobility and boundary. 
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formal and informal institutions in an evolution that shapes them both (Van Assche et al., 2013b). We 
argue that, rather than evaluating specific sets of formal or informal institutions separately, it makes 
more sense to speak of formal/informal configurations that co-evolved and have certain effects that can 
be evaluated.  
 
The Soviet legacy of discrepancy between formal and informal institutions can be seen as de facto giving 
space to a plurality of legal regimes at the local and regional level and this old plurality has implications 
for the current functioning of law (Gelman, 2004; Hayoz et al., 2013; Kornai, 1979). For the responses to 
development initiatives, we intend to investigate more precisely how Soviet legacies structure the 
patterns of expectations locally and thus the responses to new rules (legal change) and to other 
interventions aiming at development (e.g. projects). In post-Soviet locales, formal/informal dialectics are 
often highly opaque, leading to complex and unpredictable effects of changes in informality as well 
(Ledeneva, 2005).  
 
Unraveling networks of hidden mobility is thus closely linked to an unraveling of formal/informal 
configurations. Discerning the rules to apply/ignore the rules, or in other cases parallel rule sets, is 
discerning the networks in which these institutions function. Unraveling formal/informal configurations 
therefore aims at a better understanding of the reasons for opacity, including opacity regarding the 
structure and function of networks (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).  
In the following we therefore regard networks as the infrastructures for hidden mobilities (Djanibekov et 
al, 2013; Latour, 2004). We try to get a deeper understanding of (a) the functioning of these networks by 
focusing on the need for invisibility, and (b) the prevalent opacity by focusing on the layout of 
overlapping networks and the ways to navigate them. 
Hidden mobilities, then, can be understood when envisioning formal/informal configurations in a 
particular community and the networks marking it. Regarding the networks themselves, we believe it 
will be useful to distinguish between different types of networks. Some networks are more stable than 
others, some are more linked to (in-)formal institutions, navigating some involves more risk than others 
(cf Latour, 2004). The research sheds a light on the production of networks as well: in some cases, it can 
be expected that networks pre-existed mobilities, while in others, formal/informal configurations drove 
mobilities and the simultaneous construction of networks (Fuchs, 2001; Thrift, 2006). 
 
Once these insights are acquired, one can get a better idea of the impact of development interventions 
in these and similar communities: which effects will projects, plans, policies and laws aiming at 
development have? Will they alter the local roles of law? Of informal institutions? Of the dialectics with 
formal institutions? Will they alter the patterns of mobility, the creation of identities, the crossing and 
changing of boundaries? And will they reduce the need for invisibility? We argue that this set of 
questions needs to be asked before intervention and before assuming that ‘best practices’ imported 
from elsewhere will work in Central Asia.  
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2. Conceptual analysis: mobilities as bringers of change and policies 
aiming at change 
Deleuzian mobilities 
Mobilities is a concept which has received much attention recently, in anthropology, sociology and, 
probably most extensively, in geography3. With John Urry, the interest started with long-standing 
tourism research (Urry, 2000). In many cases, the concept is an extension of the interest in materialities 
and embodiment (the so-called ‘material turn’, associated with names such as Nigel Thrift, Doreen 
Massey, Sara Whatmore), an interest which was, in turn, partly motivated by the supposed lack of 
attention to these things in structuralism and post-structuralism (i.e. De Landa 2006; Teampau & Van 
Assche, 2009). Mobilities in this perspective can still mean many things, ranging from migration to 
movement and change in ecosystems, movement of people, transportation in the narrow sense and the 
travelling of concepts and identities. In many cases, Deleuzian concepts stand in the behind the 
developed arguments, ideas of a reality made up of events, flows, with identities unfolding, concepts 
opening up new spaces of thought and action, intensities as basis for identity shifts, multiplicities as 
gates to a diversity of unfolding universes, rhizomes as capable of making the most unexpected 
connections between places, actions, concepts and conceptual frames (Buchanan, 2005; Hardt, 1993). 
Space, in Deleuzian geography, is a confluence of stories, of bodies, rocks, water, plants, a temporary 
stabilization and configuration of many things in flux (Massey, 2005); yet this impermanence can still 
exert a deep influence on subjects and subjectivities (De Landa, 2002).   
 
Mobilities, then, in such materialist versions of post-structuralism, are shaping identity (Cresswell, 
1997). Actually moving through space changes the subject and everything else in that space and 
dwelling longer in certain places makes this influence stronger. In case of migration, tied to a change in 
‘home’ or territory, the impact on identities is even more profound (Braidotti, 2006). At the same time, 
patterns of mobility also create identity of spaces and subjects in a different sense, as patterns: people 
can be marked by patterns of moving, between spaces, between groups, between concepts and spaces 
can be typified by the patterns of movement taking place in them – as structures in the flux (Buchanan, 
1999) or, in Deleuzian speak, plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Mobilities in the conceptual sense can 
constitute Deleuzian ‘lines of flight’, breaking away from conceptual frames, moving away from a 
plateau, to create new connections between ideas, bodies, matter and thus new insights and identities 
(Hardt, 1993). Mobilities hence are integral to Deleuzian ideas of territorialization and de- 
territorialization: moving around breaks patterns of boundaries, while somewhere else, new, temporary 
boundaries are created, allowing for the production of new insights and identities (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1994). 
 
If we link the ongoing discussions on mobility sketched out above more thoroughly with the Deleuzian 
philosophy, we can add a few notions, which will be elaborated in the next paragraphs. Mobilities for 
Deleuze closely link to his concept of becoming. For him, in western philosophy, the concept of being 
                                                 
3 For overviews, please see the works of Urry, Cresswell and Hvattum listed in the reference list. 
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has been privileged consistently and this masks for him the reality of eternal becoming, of eternal 
change where change is not a transition between situation A and B, which are considered more real, and 
more prone to theorizing. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is the process of change itself, the becoming 
something, that reflects more accurately the state of beings. Becoming is a chain of events and changes 
in intensity. Repetition is not a return of the same, but a continuous change, as intensities will change, 
affected by other bodies, thoughts, places, or other contexts and these intensities render the difference 
between states significant. Becoming is this becoming without a plan, without an external imposition of 
a ground scheme, for the future or for the self (becoming as growing into a pre-determined identity). 
Mobilities are thus to be considered transformative and creative, not a movement of the same in a 
space that remains the same. Both, space and moving entity alter in the process. The entity in case, for 
Deleuze, can be a body, a thought, a system of organization, a material object; these can all enter into 
transversal relations that enable their reproduction and the production of new objects, thoughts etc. 
The process of establishing connections between those disparate elements, according to a non-plan, is 
called rhizomatic. Reality reproduces itself rhizomatically and rhizomatic thought comes closer to the 
structure of that reality. Mobilities can create such varied effects because so many connections can be 
made, with other thoughts, bodies and objects. Mobilities for Deleuze can take the form of lines of 
flight, in which a constellation of ideas and matter produces thoughts, actions, movements that enter a 
new space, that create new perceptions, affects, concepts and create new objects unforeseen in the 
producing of constellation (or ‘machinic assemblage’). Not all mobilities can be considered lines of flight, 
but when it is the case, one can speak of a more radical transformation, production and vanishing in the 
process of moving; the new pattern that emerges is the product of emergence, a new complexity which 
cannot be reduced to the new pattern. Mobilities can affect both actual and virtual space and actual and 
virtual concepts, bodies, etc., which means that transformations can take place by and in non-actualized 
movements, reshuffling of the potential present in a given situation. Virtual mobilities can engender 
actual mobilities, and vice versa; the actual movement of bodies, ideas and matter can transform the 
field of potential alternatives. 
Mobilities and power 
Mobilities, as for Deleuze and Guattari represented by nomadic lifestyles, are a priori threatening to 
centralized powers, trying to stabilize borders and boundaries, enabling them to control a territory more 
thoroughly (Adey, 2009; Buchanan & Lambert, 2005). Exerting power is stopping or controlling 
mobilities, in an attempt to stabilize power/knowledge configurations (Patton, 2000). Yet power also 
needs channels, infrastructure, in the conceptual and physical sense (De Landa, 2006). States need 
highways, communication channels, and administrative (enforcing and symbolic) representations to 
become engrained in people’s lives, to shape their identities in ways preferred by those in power 
(Hvattum et al., 2012). And the same (as well as additional, non-state, informal, formal/informal hybrid) 
infrastructures can and will be used to create new mobilities, and these will have unanticipated effects 
(Urry, 2000; Shields, 2013).  
 
If we see society also as a set of socio-economic positions, then mobilities include moving between 
those positions (cf. Patton, 2000). Moving to a position perceived as better, moving away from a 
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position perceived as worse, or, in more extreme cases, a position marked by scarcity, creating a 
necessity to change, to move, with perishing as only alternative (a different aspect of materiality). In 
some higher positions, moving around is required, physical mobility a necessity to maintain the position; 
it can also become a symbol of the position (Urry, 2000). Also here infrastructure is essential, and can 
include physical, institutional and scientific structures. Education and learning can turn small 
observations into information, i.e. knowing the language of power and its associated bureaucracies and 
scientific disciplines (cf. Luhmann, 1990; Foucault, 2003), useful to move and to climb the ladder.  
 
Mobilities require and cause the crossing of boundaries, and, with that, changes in the meaning and 
functioning of boundaries (Buchanan & Lambert, 2005). In some cases, the boundaries loose their 
function, erode, collapse and with that, the integrity of what is bounded, of what is delineated (Saldanha 
& Adams, 2012; Buchanan & Thoburn, 2008). This, by itself, is threatening for power/knowledge 
configurations, for the regimes associated with them and/or producing them (Barthes, 1958). The less 
democratic regimes are, or, more broadly, the less adapted to their environment and accepted in that 
environment (including the own society), the more mobilities will be hidden (Scott, 1998; cf. Luhmann, 
1995). Yet, at the same time, the more pressure is exerted, the more counter-pressure can be expected, 
e.g. the more motivation will be created in society to create alternative identities and mobilities 
(Foucault, 2003; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). In addition, strict controls, or in Deleuzian terms, a molar 
thinking creating a hyper-territorialized society, will make it harder for many to take initiative, move, 
explore, get new understandings, create new things, new identities (Buchanan, 1999), and – and this is 
not in the Deleuzian vocabulary – economic opportunities. As we have shown in earlier research on 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Hornidge et al. 2014b, forthcoming, Van Assche et al., 2013a) control creates 
scarcity, over time and lacking observation of new opportunities, and this is another aspect of its self-
undermining identity, of its call for de-territorialization. Power/knowledge configurations that allow too 
little space for transformation and deviation, thus undermining themselves (Luhmann, 1995; Pottage, 
2004) and this undermining can be described as the creation of hidden mobilities.  
 
For Deleuze, the ‘societies of discipline’ as described by Foucault are replaced by societies of control, in 
which (in line with the later Foucault) control is more interiorized, coupled with structures of incentives 
engrained in body and mind. Time/space configurations in these societies become segmented in such a 
way that re-articulation is hard, that identities are expected to be fixed, tied to stable boundaries of 
concepts, bodies, forms of organization and material order. In reality, this fixing is impossible, but the 
exploration of new identities, including new roles in society, becomes impeded and both actual and 
virtual changes become limited, in the sense of narrower in scope, and less connected to other 
mechanic forces. Conceptual simplification and rigidity implies reduction of the virtual and thus 
reduction of the possibilities for actual change, and reduction of the potential creativity and creativity in 
a given place or community. The nomadic space preferred over molar space is a space that does not pre- 
exist movement; the nomad creates the space by means of movement, actions, thoughts and the 
identity of the nomad changes while moving. The act of moving itself is the only persistent element of 
self-definition. Space-time is created in the act of moving of the nomad and concepts, bodies, 
projections for the future, are tied to that. The frames of reference that produce other entities, 
conceptual and material, are thus a co-production of nomad and movement and not something that can 
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be ascribed to either a nomad individual or social identity assumed stable or a physio-spatial referent 
assumed stable. This, for Deleuze, represents a way of life and thinking and becoming that resonates 
more with the creative possibilities inherent in a universe where things and thoughts are in a constant 
flux.   
Mobilities, boundaries and scales 
Power/knowledge configurations, we argue in line with Foucault (1968, 1975, 2003), tend historically 
and logically to scale up, to grow, to incorporate and transform others. This makes a more complex and 
therefore scaled internal organization necessary (Luhmann, 1995). Growth means organization and 
organization requires segmentation and hence scaling. The set of changes often described as 
globalization brings along new patterns of scaling in new patterns of organization (Castells, 1996; Fuchs, 
2001). Multinational companies might in many ways disregard and undermine national boundaries, but 
internally their size and complexity creates layers and segments and the coordination of their activities, 
and compliance with a central vision, becomes ever more complex (Christensen, 1997; Seidl, 2005). 
Politically, the growing importance of the EU, undermining some functions of the nation-state, 
practically required the strengthening of regions and/or local political entities. The homogenization of 
social, cultural, economic life also brought forth the re-articulation of older small-scale identities, or 
their reinvention (Swyngedouw, 2004; Paasi, 1991; Van Assche, 2004). This, we argue, in contrast with 
much of the literature, is not primarily a matter of protest or resistance and neither it is a sign of the 
inherent failing of the global capitalist system. It is rather, and simply, part of the same set of boundary 
and scale transformations that can be traced back to the European medieval city states and their modes 
of organization (Jacobs & Van Assche, 2014; cf. Greif, 2006, Luhmann, 1995). 
 
Societies, and communities embedded in them, thus need boundaries and scales, to organize 
themselves, in practical and cognitive terms, to allow power/knowledge configurations to reproduce 
themselves and to enable coordination of action, by means of formal and informal institutions (Van 
Assche et al., 2013b, c; Hornidge et al. 2013). Physio-spatial, social and epistemic boundaries shape and 
alter each other however and this renders different scales relevant for different reasons at different 
times. Mobilities render the nature of these processes more dynamic. They cannot be considered solely 
in their undermining effects on boundaries and scales. Mobilities just as well contribute to the formation 
of new boundaries and scales; new mobilities in societies, with formerly rigid patterns of stratification 
and territorialization, can cause and be caused by new social boundaries, e.g. by an intensification of 
clan contacts and a solidification of clan boundaries. Medieval Mongols had to be tightly organized, in 
military units that served as social units and the boundaries of those were guarded and maintained 
zealously. Entirely unstructured (unbounded) self-transformation thus seems to be impossible, as then 
there is no self left to transform (De Landa, 2006; cf Varela & Maturana, 1992). Erasing boundaries and 
scales comes down to reducing societal complexity, which is possible and could be observed, but the 
communities left are de facto more bound by smaller spaces and smaller epistemic spaces, thus 
recreating boundaries more rigid and rigidly coupled, at a smaller scale. 
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Mobilities are therefore not only traditionally threatening for the centers of power (in consequence 
causing hidden mobilities) but are also in the popular imagination fraught with danger and often cast in 
a menacing light: the nomads not only were possible raiders, their presence also loosened the epistemic 
and social frameworks people relied on to identify, orient and coordinate themselves with (Braidotti, 
2006; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Bonta & Protevi, 2004). Their mere presence and their success, 
rendered the story of a natural and necessary order in society, their order, less persuasive, and this was 
not only a threat for possibly oppressive powers, but also for the people who identified with the reigning 
power/knowledge configuration. Also popular tropes of loss of self in migration or in excessive 
intellectual exploration, or social mobility, point at the same fears (Massey, 2005).  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming means becoming different, not merely – as in psycho-analysis – a 
cutting loose of neurotic habits, of compulsory repetitions of symptoms tied to old images and 
experiences. Instead, becoming for Deleuze and Guattari is life, as a force and life is expressive, is joy. 
Using one’s potential, as individual and community, using it to the fullest, exploring the potential for 
creative transformation, is ethically commendable. Yet, as said, such self-transformation, with all the 
unexpected rhizomatic connections, lines of flight, and de-territorializations, can only avoid chaos and 
reactive power turning back on itself, when it embraces structure as well, as long as its creative 
potential is there, as long as its virtual field allows for actual changes in various directions. Thinking and 
acting, for Deleuze, therefore needs rules and roles, but simultaneously needs to harbor spaces of loose 
connectivity with these rules and roles. Not a continuous meta-reflection, but a cultivation of percepts, 
affects and concepts that expand the potential for thought and action, the reasons and manners to stick 
to boundaries and to cross or undermine them by crossing.  
Mobilities and boundaries 
The boundaries that are crossed and sometimes undermined in and by mobilities are threefold: social, 
physio-spatial and epistemic. Mobilities can also be categorized in this manner. One has to be careful 
however to note that each of the mobilities can have repercussions for each of the boundaries. Social 
mobility will affect the crossing and functioning of physio-spatial boundaries, epistemic mobility can 
entail changes to physio-spatial and social boundaries or changes in their functioning.  
 
Differentiation though can be added by pointing out that social, physio-spatial and epistemic boundaries 
affect each other, even without interference of mobilities. Social boundaries delineate identities, yet 
these identities structure themselves using epistemic and physio-spatial boundaries as well (Eriksen, 
2002). Political territories often line up with social identities and the powers that be often use epistemic 
boundaries to increase the cohesion of the territory and the consistency of the social identities (Paasi, 
1991; Massey, 2005). In other cases, epistemic boundaries preexist social identities, contribute to their 
solidification and this furthers the creation of physio-spatial boundaries (Whatmore, 2002). Changes in 
the functioning of one boundary can trigger changes in the others; change in physio-spatial boundaries 
can trigger social and epistemic change processes and vice versa (Cresswell, 1997; Braidotti, 2006). 
Epistemic boundaries, as boundaries of concepts but also of narratives and discourses, consisting of 
concepts, can shift for various reasons, not limited to mobilities and these shifts can affect physio-spatial 
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boundaries (Van Assche, 2004), as in the lines in space that acquire meaning for relevant difference. 
Political boundaries are physio-spatial, but correlate to a certain extent with epistemic and social 
boundaries (Buchanan, 1999). The correlation is influenced by respective power/knowledge 
configurations in place. If the political territory is marked by a strong unified discourse, and if most 
people believe in this, then the correlation between social, physio-spatial and epistemic boundary is 
strong at the political boundary. This is not always the case of course and the history of the formation of 
empires and nation states is the history of attempts to control the formation and evolution of social 
boundaries, as identities, and to unify and homogenize the territory (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). The 
Romantic idea of the nation state made such correlation a prerequisite, arguing that any political 
boundary should be an epistemic and social boundary the unity of these last two expressed as culture 
(Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1981). 
 
Social identities use social boundaries to distinguish themselves, but also physio-spatial and epistemic 
boundaries. Groups associate with places, areas and with discourses, concepts, histories (as narratives 
about the past of a group, or from the perspective of the group). Any change can affect the construction 
of both past and future (Van Assche et al., 2009). And these can also pose challenges to the ruling 
power/knowledge configuration. If a subgroup becomes a group, if a clan becomes more important than 
a party, if a profession becomes more important than a family, then the aggregate changes affect the 
power/knowledge configuration, partly via the changes in physio-spatial and epistemic boundaries.  
If we add the concept of mobility, as introduced here, then the dynamics of boundary negotiation 
becomes even more intricate. The crossing of boundaries that might be necessary or desirable in a 
certain power/knowledge configuration, already starts changing the identities involved by the mere act 
of moving (Massey, 2005), and by the fact that new relations emerge all the time, with other identities, 
places and stories (Saldanha & Adams, 2012).  
 
Mobilities, thus, also for Deleuze, are not necessarily positive. Also lines of flight can be destructive. 
While pure de-territorialization can create chaos that might be just as oppressive and non-creative as 
any totalitarian regime. Power for Deleuze is also the power of becoming, of creative transformation in 
mobilities, the forces that make it possible for beings to develop and development is seen as expression 
of a potential (a virtual field). Power is thus, as for Foucualt, not something negative, and it cannot be 
solely associated with state power. For Deleuze, state power is often reactive power, as opposed to 
active power, and ideas of community are often representing it as a pre-existing unit that has to be 
managed or improved, while for Deleuze, the community can be remade by harnessing new powers. Not 
individuals, organizations, boundaries, are to be considered, with relations that can be managed, but 
sets of relations that are a constellation of power. Remaking communities starts with understanding 
that power needs to be recreated, and then both community and individual (in an assemblage) will be 
remade. Here, we can intuit that invisibility can be a way to grasp the potential to change, without 
referring to pre-existing roles and rules; we can also intuit that material want, necessity, brings about 
mobilities that cross any boundary that needs to be crossed.  
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Mobilities and scale 
Scale is a concept that has been under attack from different sides (see the works of Swyngedouw (2004), 
Thrift (2008), Cresswell (2011, 2010), Whatmore (2006), Massey (2005), as well as (less) Jessop et al. 
(2008), Leitner et al. (2008) e.g.). Understanding mobilities is also understanding scale, as mobilities can 
affect and be affected by scales. If one distinguishes several scales, one assumes different layers or 
levels of boundaries. Multi-scale governance assumes nested territories, where in movement, first 
boundaries of the same scale are crossed, then boundaries of a higher level, scale etc. The same 
principle applies to social, physio-spatial and epistemic boundaries; concepts can be clustered in 
discourses and those in discursive configurations (Bal, 2002; Paasi, 1991). Social identities can be layered 
and clustered (Eriksen, 2002). Scale as a concept has been attacked by proponents of globalization, 
arguing that fewer spatial scales have an impact on communities and individual life; that it is far more 
important now, after a long era of erasing scales, to look at the impact of the whole, of global society, 
on what is happening (e.g. Castells, 1996).  
Scale was also attacked by various strands of geographers, Deleuzian and neo-marxist, arguing that in 
the practical unfolding of reality scale is not a necessary concept. Instead mobility is regarded as the 
essence and micro and macro effects of events are intimately tied, with each series of events, each 
rhizome, being marked by its own set of dimensions (Massey, 2005; De Landa, 2006), sometimes 
harboring marked scales, sometimes not. Scaling reality is enforcing morality in and by analysis and 
reinforcing the oppressive effects of a scalar organization (Buchanan & Lambert, 2005; Scott, 1998). In a 
different version of critique, scale only emerges from the bottom, in micro-interactions in networks 
(Fuchs, 2001; Whatmore, 2006), where larger networks might not always be perceived and where a 
semantics of a layered whole might be useful in navigating the local network environment.  
 
We would argue that, indeed, one cannot assume the continuous relevance of a given set of scales (for 
reason of the boundary and mobility mechanics just described), that indeed scales are in continuous 
transformation, that indeed there is usually a difference between the rhetorics of scale (and boundary) 
and the practices of crossing scales, jumping scales, ignoring scales, and piecing together various scale 
effects at the local level. We also acknowledge that higher level physio-spatial units (and their global-to 
local-level discourses) and social unities have become generally more relevant in structuring the life of 
communities. Yet none of this takes away from the need for boundaries and for scaled boundaries in the 
functioning of individuals, communities, society at large (Hornidge, 2014; Jacobs & Van Assche, 2014). 
For every erased boundary, a new one emerges, for every altered scale effect, another one pops up. As 
van Houtum (2005) and others said, bordering is ordering and society needs order to function. Also 
Deleuzian nomads create and operate on certain scales (Patton, 2000) and these are – we add – physio-
spatial, epistemic and social in nature. Their social boundaries can be the ones of families, clans, tribes, 
confederations, empires. Their physio-spatial boundaries can be the ones of a temporary village, clan 
territory, new conquest, homeland. Their epistemic boundaries can be the ones of military organization, 
nature religion, with sedentary societies as fodder. Their mobilities seem unbounded and free of scale 
only from the perspective of sedentary societies and of the political entities attacked or crossed and 
permeated by them.  
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For Deleuze, some of the plateau’s that produce identities and insights and stabilize them for a while 
can be associated with a physio-spatial scale. Or, in other words, the assemblages that produce relevant 
effects in society can create a space that can be grasped as existing only at one level. Rhizomatic 
connections cross potentially all scale-levels and a given space-time can be produced by a rhizome that 
makes spaces relevant at a certain scale. It is possible that other scales are not observed from the 
plateau and it is possible that they are observed, with boundaries then becoming visible.  
Mobilities and (seeming) stability 
The fact that political boundaries do not change every day is misleading in the sense that it veils the 
constant turmoil that characterizes each society and community, the interplay between boundaries and 
identities of the different sorts described, the impact of mobilities, visible and hidden (Deleuze 1995; 
Scott, 1998). Political boundaries stay in place only if power is exerted, from the inside or from the 
outside (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Mansfeld, 1993). Yet while staying in place, their meaning and 
functioning can change dramatically; their relations with social and epistemic identities can alter. Their 
crossing can vary, the mobilities they allow or encourage can change (Patton, 2000). It is not strange 
therefore that political boundaries can suddenly collapse, that regimes can suddenly collapse, as they 
are naturally undermined by the way societies work. 
 
Power/knowledge configurations form society, but society also transforms itself continuously under the 
radar of these configurations and these transformations are bound to produce a situation at a certain 
point where the stories of the powerful are not persuasive anymore (Luhmann, 1990), where more and 
more pressure is needed to maintain the boundaries and where the application of power to that 
purpose becomes less and less efficient (Eriksen, 2002; cf. Anderson, 1991) and were the enforcement 
and implementation of rules, laws, policies becomes increasingly difficult (Mansfeld, 1993; Hayoz & 
Giordano, 2013). Political entities can extend their survival and partly deal with this set of mechanisms 
by allowing for self-transformation, for mobilities, for changes in physio-spatial, epistemic and social 
boundaries (Jacobs & Van Assche, 2014; Buchanan & Thoburn, 2008). External boundaries might be hard 
to alter, in an era where conquest is frowned upon, and dissolution of nation states is seen as a threat to 
international order or an inherent problem. But internal physio-spatial boundaries can be moved, and 
new relevant scales can be created (Swyngedouw, 2000; 2004). If we see Area Studies in the old 
paradigm as the study of physio-spatial units, as containers of cultural and epistemic unities, if we see 
them as assuming stable linkages between physio-spatial, epistemic and social boundaries, and stable 
articulations of scale internally, then the mobilities and processes of boundary-making and –
renegotiating that can be observed physio-spatially, just as much as socially and epistemically, urge us to 
rethink Area Studies along the lines of the research perspective put forth by Crossroads Asia. 
 
For Deleuze, societal complexity means also that one cannot grasp everything at the same time and 
from the same perspective, neither the scientist-observer, nor the politician trying to control. 
Complexity (just as much as differentiation), in a world of becoming, means that things are changing 
beyond the view of observers. In a society, many things might look the same, and society might 
reproduce itself on many levels, but meanwhile significant change might gradually build up, either in the 
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virtual or in actual practices not considered relevant, to suddenly erupt. This is why for Deleuze, 
societies are defined by their lines of flight. Mobilities and radically transformative mobilities occur all 
the time, even if not observed. For Deleuze, May 1968 represented such eruption (Deleuze, 1995), a 
break with the past that created a new world, a creation of new legal, political and cultural futures, a 
reordering of the virtual; invisible mobilities created a juncture, a break, after which nothing could be 
the same and could be imagined the same way anymore. This is what Deleuze calls absolute de- 
territorialization (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). 
 
The break-up of the USSR can be considered in this light. Afterwards, old boundaries could not 
realistically be returned to the old state, old rules, roles and identities had to be reconsidered. Both 
elements and structures shifted in this event, slowly prepared and one cannot speak of elements which 
found new relations. Rather, a new force made elements and structures. This does not exclude the 
possibility of path dependence, of legacies from the past. But lingering concepts, lingering materialities, 
lingering diagrams of power and identity are now reinterpreted. In a flat ontology one cannot say that 
the appearances change the essence, but one can say that what is left enters new productive 
assemblages, creating new effects. Old boundaries can be crossed anew, but old crossings (as well as 
non-crossings) have different effects. New powers never impose the same boundaries, as no event is 
ever the same and no becoming ever unfolds in the same manner. 
Mobilities and institutions 
If we pay closer attention to institutions and revisit our concept of formal/ informal configurations, we 
can say now that these self-transforming patterns of coordinative rules cannot be separated from 
mobilities. If mobilities are hidden, either to escape oppressive powers or to escape the law in less 
oppressive environments, then their coordination will rely more on informal institutions. If such hidden 
mobilities are prevalent, they will tend to perpetuate a configuration heavily leaning on informality, and 
undermine the impact of formal rules (Easterly, 2006). If hidden mobilities are prevalent, in a situation 
dominated by informality, social, physio-spatial and epistemic boundaries will change under the radar, 
and rather than slow and deliberate self-transformation, one can expect shocks, convulsions, collapsing 
structures and strong coercion to keep them in place (Deleuze, 1995). Hidden mobilities, by virtue of 
their hiding, are unlikely to be coordinated by means of formal institutions (Mansfield, 1993), the official 
rules of the game, representing an authority one is likely to avoid.  
 
This does not mean that every rule will be broken in every mobility, that every trajectory through social 
or epistemic space will have much reverberation in society, and it does not mean that self- 
transformation of the formal/ informal configuration is impossible in every case. It also leaves open the 
possibility that formally recognized actors, in their official roles, use the same informal rules as others 
and can accept, sponsor, profit from, or even participate in, some of the hidden mobilities they 
supposedly don’t observe (Collins, 2006; Solnick, 1998). As said, informality extends to rules to apply the 
rules, to ignore them, interpret them etc. (cf. Zizek, 2008) and where the law does not apply evenly, this 
gives more space for people in power to serve themselves by means of informal and/or formal 
institutions and hybrids of the two (Luhmann, 2004; Gelman, 2004).  
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What it does mean, and here we refer again to our more expansive Deleuzian view of mobilities 
expounded earlier, is that the effects of hidden mobilities, tolerated or not by power/knowledge 
configurations, are less predictable because of the nature of mobilities, the unexpected relations and 
transformations it caused. What remains under the radar thus has the tendency to expand, to 
mushroom and the previous set of informal rules becomes less apt themselves to regulate domains of 
social practice, whether for public or for private gain.  
 
Deleuze (1987) quotes Spinoza, saying ‘nobody knows what a body can do’, and this means that it 
cannot be predicted how a body will affect and be affected by others (body to be understood in a broad 
sense, as part of a rhizomatic assemblage). Bodies combine into composite bodies, which increase the 
capacity to be affected and thus to create new connections. Collective bodies include organizations and 
communities and these have to be considered as sets of relations, allowing for communal affects and 
effects. The elements of the community are made anew in the act of composition and the set of 
relations cannot be considered a blueprint in the sense of an essence. The actual relations between the 
elements will change and are ontologically primary to the elements; this derives from the emphasis on 
becoming and on relations (versus on stability and elements). Boundaries in the community, in their 
physio-spatial and epistemic worlds, follow the same reasoning; they are a derivative of changing forces, 
and their formal persistence does not mirror their actual function. Their effects, in other words, are less 
important than what they are affected by and forgetting this is forgetting the power of hidden 
mobilities.  
Mobilities and the functions of law (as formal institution) 
We can refine these insights by distinguishing three functions of law in development policy and practice: 
upholding, enabling and delimiting (Beunen et al., 2014). If we see development policy as the collection 
of policies to improve society, in whatever sense is defined within society as desirable, then this requires 
coordination of actions and integration of policies (Van Assche & Djanibekov, 2012). It implies a vision of 
a desirable future and a vision of a good way to work in that direction, as well as a shared idea on the 
problems in the current situation (Hillier, 2002). Formal institutions, such as laws, plans and policies, can 
be used to work in that direction, to further development (Easterly, 2006; de Soto, 2000; Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012). Law, as one category of formal institution, can be a tool to further the others, i.e. plans 
and policies; it can also be a limit, or a break, on the others, on their formation or implementation 
(Luhmann, 2004; Rosen 2008; Platt, 2003). And they can support the others, or their emergence, by 
granting legitimate powers to certain actors to produce visions and work in their direction.  
Mobilities affect law in these three functions and this can be understood as three possible paths of 
interference with the effect of development interventions. Each path can further be described in terms 
of the three types of boundaries mentioned, and respective scale effects.  
 
Mobilities can affect social, epistemic and physio-spatial boundaries and individual identities navigating 
them; they can engender different forms of organization, different value systems, different impact of 
official narratives, different understandings of self, place and other. Law as enabling element is touched 
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by these mechanisms because the implementation of any policy, even if helped by law, hinges crucially 
on its believability in society (cf. Mansfeld, 1993; Easterly, 2006; Rose, 2008). It also hinges on tools of 
implementation as tools of de facto coordination of action (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979); if law 
becomes paper law because of mobilities, because itself or the policy it underpins becomes less 
believable, or because the tools for implementation have been eroded by mobilities (think local social 
structures being altered, think money gone), then the policy supported by the law has little effect 
(Beunen et al., 2014). Hidden mobilities aggravate this tendency. 
 
Something similar applies to the function of law as delimiting policies. The limits can be easily 
circumvented in and by mobilities and a prevalence of hidden mobilities makes this more likely. As said, 
such a situation usually means a dominance of informal coordination, and this also means that law in its 
function of delimiting policy making and implementation, is likely to be eroded and rendered ineffective. 
This form of erosion can be most interesting for corrupt officials and those in power, with access to 
policy-makers (Ledeneva, 2013). Implementation of policy can break legal limits more easily when 
formal rules in general lost vigor (Allina-Pisano, 2008) and this can happen when the situation supposed 
to be covered by those rules has changed because of mobilities. Policy can lose its breaks when 
boundaries have changed and law didn’t take this into account. If social identities have changed, 
identifications with the law can have changed and thus its power (Hardt, 1993; Deleuze, 1995); a similar 
change with regards to policy and the envisioned common good can occur. If identifications have altered 
that change both identification with law and policy, then things as policy abuse, for private or group 
gain, can more easily take place (Mansfeld 1993); then law as delimiting factor in development policy 
loses its teeth. The same applies to physio-spatial boundaries and epistemic boundaries. The delimiting 
power of law changes when physio-spatial boundaries acquire a different relevance or disappear 
altogether (Jacobs, 1991) and when epistemic frames evolve in and through mobilities (Platt, 2003). 
 
Law as upholding policy is similarly affected. Indirectly, by the loss of importance of legitimacy as such 
(Luhmann, 2004), of the perceived value of the legal system, and more directly, because the connections 
between a law and the policy it is supposed to support can be broken in many ways by mobilities. 
Epistemic boundaries might have changed, making the relation between law and policy less visible, less 
evident, less persuasive (Scott, 1998; Ferguson, 1994). Physio-spatial boundaries might have changed, 
rendering the law maybe very directly inapplicable. Social boundaries might have changed, influencing 
the pattern of identification with both law and policy, as said, and reshaping the perceived link between 
policy and law, thus the potential of law to uphold the policy. Law, policy, and their link can be more 
easily disputed or ignored. 
 
Mobilities, through their boundary and scaling effects, can thus alter the functions of law, as delimiting, 
enabling and upholding policy. Mobilities can further redefine the relation between these functions, and 
disrupt their mutually supportive character – in case a smoothly functioning legal system existed before 
(cf. Ledeneva, 2005; Ruble, 1995). Indeed, for law to do its work in relation to policy, in a democratic 
regime, all three functions have to be there and have to support each other (Beunen et al., 2014). This is 
partly a matter of internal consistency of the legal system, of consistent relations between laws, 
between law and constitution and between law and policy. But it is also a matter of enforcement of law, 
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as in forcing compliance and punishing deviance; and a matter of implementation, as requiring a set of 
tools going beyond law. Resources can be gone, people, expertise, infrastructure, institutional memory, 
informal coordination mechanisms etc. ad infinitum. ‘Implementation’ is always evolution (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1979; Latour, 2004), movement across boundaries and scales, and involvement of a series of 
tools and resources that can be affected by mobilities (Van Assche et al., 2011) and by the relations 
between law and policy as described. Policies might not be implemented because the expertise is gone, 
but also because the experts do not see the relation anymore between law, policy and social need 
(Gunder & Hillier, 2009). 
 
For Deleuze, these effects of mobilities on the diverse functions of laws, through their boundary and 
scale effects, would seem obvious. What can be pieced together with insights from different disciplines, 
looks simple if one starts from the Deleuzian ontology of forces and becomings. If the best description of 
a society is an assemblage of bodies, of bodies as becomings and shaped by relations, then no identity 
can be assumed stable and no rule supposed to govern the practices of bodies human and non-human, 
will be able to hold for long, will be able to fully govern the unfolding multiplicity of new relations 
formed in society. Simultaneously, the structures temporarily stabilized by law, are just as necessary to 
maintain the productivity and allow for the reproduction of society. Implementation in a Deleuzian 
perspective is the path of new encounters, with new concepts and objects and people, and new 
rhizomatic extensions, and in each case a shift in the virtual field that allows for new actual moves. Each 
new encounter in the process of implementation changes the idea, changes the bodies encountering the 
policies and gives some new ideas on how to use and bend the rule for new purposes in ever changing 
contexts. Implementation itself thus invokes all three functions of law, invokes continuous de- and re- 
territorializations and represents the practice of remaking society while pretending to maintain it, and 
thus the practice of creating uncertainty while pretending to contain it.  
 
In the following, we develop the above argument (and thought process) further by means of two cases 
in post-Soviet space: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Both share a Soviet past, a tumultuous transition, yet in 
markedly different directions. We briefly sketch the Soviet situation with regards to mobilities, 
boundaries and institutions, proceed to the cases of the two former republics, paying special attention 
to networks as infrastructures for mobilities. We conclude with a further developed reflection on the 
consequences of our analysis for development intervention.  
3. Soviet and post-Soviet mobilities  
Managing mobilities 
Mobilities in a narrow sense, as people moving through physical and/or social space, have something to 
do with opportunity and need, with escaping from something or wanting something (tourism is a bit 
more complicated; cf. Urry, 2000). In that sense, the USSR was a breeding ground for mobility, and at 
the same time a regime that tightly controlled the movement of people, with an extensive system of 
permits, travel permits and residence permits [propiska’s] (Humphrey, 2002). Many people wanted to 
escape, move or travel and were hindered in their pursuits, while at the same time many moved around 
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within the vast USSR, either forced or looking for opportunity in regions with more investment and 
development (Taubman, 1973). The USSR created its own set of reasons for forms of and obstacles to 
physio-spatial mobilities. It attempted to create new identities and erase other identities by means of 
moving people and preventing them from moving around. Tourism was restricted to controlled patterns 
within the USSR, and tourist trips were rewards for good behavior, for reproducing the norms proposed 
by the USSR. The imagination of self and other was at the same time altered, with incomplete success.  
 
Presenting the West as imperialist etc. did not always have the desired effects and often it triggered 
desires for the West, an investment of the West with everything the USSR did not see to offer. 
Furthermore, the assemblaged USSR itself created desires, including the desire to move, to act 
differently, see other places, cross boundaries. In Deleuzian terms it was a machine that structured the 
flows of desire, a structure of interruptions pretending to offer and be a final form of desire (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1983). The USSR formed the plane of possible interpretations of the future, including future 
movements and shaped both virtual and actual mobilities. Moving itself is mechanic in the sense that it 
potentially restructures everything else, the objects encountered, desired, the places encountered and 
desired, the individuals and in the end, society as a whole. Travel is thus inherently dangerous for any 
political regime believing in social engineering and relying on authoritarian mechanisms of control. The 
rhizomatic linkage of physio-spatial, epistemic and social mobilities makes it all the more dangerous. 
Control in the USSR thus extended to all three mobilities: reading and traveling and receiving/buying 
could all alter the circuitry of desire and identification and reshape the frames of self-interpretation that 
led to social structure. Managing mobilities in consequence was of utmost importance. 
 
Besides attempts to arrest mobilities, the USSR did attempt to attract desire and identification by means 
of a positive alternative (Westerman, 2010; Weiner, 1999). Social engineering included mass investment 
in modernization of the country, in the beginning focusing on heavy industries and the military complex, 
but for most of Soviet history, there was also a keen awareness that results had to be shown quickly to 
many citizens, that coercion alone would not work without offering some credible vision of the future or 
– in later periods – at least an acceptable welfare state and a (silently tolerated) degree of freedom to 
deviate from the professed pattern of rules and roles. Early communism saw a focus on Ukraine, a bit 
later Central Asia was the target of development policy and afterwards Siberia received most attention 
(French, 1995). In Ukraine, heavy industries were most important, in Central Asia cotton production, in 
Siberia oil, gas, mining. For people with a good education, or connections, or an entrepreneurial spirit, 
and with a capacity to believe the ideology or at least not openly oppose it, there were opportunities 
within the USSR, ways to travel, to migrate, to find better jobs somewhere else (Iordachi & Van Assche, 
2014; Richardson, 2005). Internal private or semi-private trade (initiated by small governmental actors 
supposedly doing something else) was very active since Chrustjev (Humphrey, 1998; Suny, 1995). One 
could also climb the ladder in politics and economy, with work, skills, networking. The state apparatus 
was internally so complex that knowledge of the apparatus was very valuable to make a career (Elster et 
al., 1998; Kornai, 1979; Hough & Fainsod, 1979) and so complex that many positions were available and 
many different routes were thinkable in most professions (Hahn, 1988).  
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So social and physio-spatial mobility were possible. Also epistemic mobilities were tolerated to a certain 
degree (the cultivation of ‘critical’ intelligentsia) and even indirectly encouraged, in the cult of learning. 
Free reinvention of social identities in mobilities was deeply suspicious however, as the regime wanted 
control over the redrawing of social boundaries (Weiner, 1999; Suny, 1995; Ruble et al, 2001). This was 
seen, especially in the beginning, as a prerequisite for the formation of Soviet society. Social classes 
were demolished; farmers were driven off the land and ethnic groups moved and dispersed as forced 
physio-spatial mobility was thought to engender social change (Viola, 1999; Stoner-Weiss, 1997). Ethnic 
groups and republics were seemingly respected, but in fact redefined and reconstructed, in order to give 
the appearance of a diverse union, but also to destroy old allegiances and identities, and to open up 
individuals and groups for new identities, new physio-spatial and epistemic boundaries, to the creation 
of a new society which required new units and new delineations at all levels and in all domains (Weiner, 
1999; Westerman, 2010). The regime was however never fully unified and its complex organization 
structure, combined with the complex cultural landscape it was supposed to steer and reorganize, made 
for often inconsistent incentives for group formation and identification; each region and republic had its 
own set of pressures on existing and new identities, different reasons to stay with, to invest in (Jones-
Luong, 2002) certain social affiliations (Ruble et al., 2001) and these identity shifts were entwined with 
different patterns of mobilities. 
 
For the regime, initiation and management of mobilities was thus crucial in its path of managed self-
transformation. Propaganda was important, all forms of reading, films, music, art, moving people 
around, relearning them the past, present and future (Westerman, 2010). Education was even more 
important, in order to build the industrialized workers’ paradise dreamt up, in order to blur class lines 
and ethnic lines, and to instill various aspects of the ideology. Education was a key component to change 
lives, but again in a managed direction, towards the creation of Soviet man, the building block of 
communist society (Hahn, 1988; Verdery, 2003). A cult of education and a cult of science ensued, with 
science supposedly underpinning policy and competitive education supposedly erasing all other, older, 
forms of unfair competition, based on class, race, gender, networks (North, 2005; Scott, 1998). And 
indeed, many of these lines were blurred, new identities were created, and many aspects of the political 
school of thought were persuasive (even now).  
 
One can say that the belief in the power of mobilities was great (in true Hegelian spirit; cf. Zizek, 2008), 
in their transforming power, their entanglement of physio-spatial, social and epistemic change. One can 
also say that the Soviet belief in the manageability of mobilities was too great, an aspect of a social 
engineering ideology which overestimated systematically the power of central steering (Kornai, 1979), 
the possibility to oversee every operation from the center, to assess the effects of its operations and to 
correct itself (the critique made famous by Friedrich August von Hayek). Too much was directly tied to 
ideology and the direct coupling of many beliefs and actions with an ideology deemed infallible, made 
self-correction and adaptation difficult (Luhmann, 1990). Moreover, overestimating the power of plans, 
norms and targets (Taubman, 1973; French, 1995), without detailed knowledge of local conditions, and 
thus of the possibility to comply and of the appropriateness of them, created large grey zones, hidden 
scarcities, hidden quality problems, timing problems, and hidden forms of competition of scarce 
resources (Kornai, 1979; Ruble, 1995; Hough & Fainsod, 1979).  
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Mending the gaps in mobilities management 
The state was not entirely blind of course and responded in a variety of ways, just as local communities 
and individuals responded to this situation in a variety of ways. The grey zones allowed for informal 
coordination that could deal with some of the problems of institutional design and steering briefly 
sketched (Giordano & Hayoz, 2013; Humphrey, 2002). They also invited informal coordination for 
private and group gain, with group gain inside and outside the state apparatus (Allina-Pisano, 2008). The 
problems of central steering and oversight created new mobilities, by necessitating them for survival, by 
creating spaces of alternative opportunity. Necessity and opportunity for mobilities are two sides of the 
same coin, just as invitation and enabling of alternative coordination. The mere fact that some things did 
not work, slowly eroded the belief in the ideology, in the formal rules and the stories associated with 
them (Elster et al., 1998; Kornai & Rose-Ackerman, 2004), and a history of informal coordination created 
actors, institutions, networks that became entrenched (Friedgut & Hahn, 1994; Ledeneva, 2013; 
Remnick, 1997). Sometimes these were only feeding off collective resources, sometimes they would 
contribute to the production of collective goods, but in almost all cases they tended to perpetuate 
themselves. 
 
Slowly, entirely parallel career paths became thinkable. Whereas the kolkhoz system and to a lesser 
extent the system of industrial enterprises created micro-environments where informality could be used 
to correct some problems of central steering and to adapt to local circumstances, for benefit of the state 
and for local benefit (Humphrey, 1998; Van Assche & Djanibekov, 2011; Shtaltovna et al. 2014, 
forthcoming), bureaucratic careers could also be structured along lines of clan, family, ethnic networks 
(Jones-Luong, 2002), could be inspired purely by patronage and networks of reciprocal favors and 
obligations (Ledeneva, 2005; French, 1995). In other words, it became possible to stay within the state, 
and largely ignore the official job description, assumed expertise and jump from one profitable job to 
others, helped by others you were supposed to return the favor, creating the basis for an elaborate 
system of mutual reciprocity (Hornidge et al. 2013, 2011a). The degree of disconnect between the 
formally expected career path and actual career tracks differed per region, republic, city, sometimes 
industry (Ruble et al., 2001; Remnick, 1997; Ioffe et al., 2006). What interestingly enough aggravated 
this tendency towards disconnect (and thus the further unraveling of the system, its institutions and 
believability) was the American-like belief in the ‘manager’, as a person who could oversee any kind of 
operation, regardless of substantive knowledge of the activity, the organization, the context (Berliner, 
1957; Hough, 1969; Hahn, 1988). Management skills were supposed to be largely independent of 
content and could be transferred easily. One can draw a connection with the American managerial 
revolution of the 1940s and 1950s, but also with the early communist idea of the good Soviet as an 
organizer of anything (Westerman, 2010).  
 
A second path was that of the ‘businessman’, an entrepreneurial type, again inside and outside 
government, who was particularly adept at spotting markets, unaddressed demand and unexploited 
opportunity in the complex Soviet economy (Nove, 1961), and using his insights in that economy to fill 
the gaps. Part-time farmers in southern Ukraine would sell strawberries in Moscow, car parts in Georgia 
were sold in Siberia, Armenian cognac was traded directly in Odessa by informal associations of farmers, 
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etc. (Richardson, 2014). Until today, the statement ‘he is a businessman’ in rural Uzbekistan describes a 
person able to seize opportunities, well-connected and able to work the system (Oberkircher/Hornidge 
2011; Trevisani 2007). During Soviet times, this path of ‘businessmen’ operated sometimes within the 
law, sometimes outside; in case where it was technically illegal, the response could be accepting as well, 
since the demand was often also acknowledged by officials in the receiving area (cf. Szelenyi, 1988). A 
third track, was in crime, with criminal networks offering prestigious career paths, partly inside and 
partly outside the state (Ledeneva, 2005, 2013). The state, as always, had the resources and the powers 
to extract more. In some republics [e.g. in the Caucasus and Central Asia] late Soviet youth found 
criminal careers as desirable and respectable as government careers (Suny, 1995). 
 
All these ways of addressing flaws of the system and exploiting its opportunities, created new mobilities 
and altered boundaries (Ruble, 1995). It also created a situation where gaps between formal and 
informal institutions were considered normal; where informality was expected to play a role, both 
positive and negative. In many cases, the USSR was quite restrained in its reaction to informal 
institutions, alternative careers and other hidden mobilities, as these were not entirely hidden, and had 
benefits. Sudden enforcement could lead to disruption of informal coordination and thus disappearance 
of the communal benefits. Suddenly holding all kolkhozi to all plans and policies, would mean that they 
could not exploit local and temporal opportunity well, and that the local community and probably the 
community at large would be less well served (Van Assche & Djanibekov, 2011). The roles, rules and 
networks created did start to lead their own life, and for the center it became increasingly hard to 
distinguish beneficial forms of informality from mere criminal activity (Collins, 2006; Ruble et al., 2001). 
After independence, these actor/institution configurations held a sway over institutional development 
and mobility in many of the republics (Jones-Luong, 2002; Slezkine, 1994). Where state authority 
crumbled most, they became the new regime or formed a coalition with elements of the former state 
apparatus (Collins, 2006; Schoeberlein, 1994; Suny, 1995; Hornidge et al. 2013). What was hidden 
became visible in different manners per republic, and sometimes, it became the center of power 
(Remnick, 1997; Ioffe et al., 2006; Ledeneva, 2013). These evolutions in turn caused new hidden 
mobilities, as each reconfiguration of power/knowledge sparks off its own resistance, its own mobilities, 
hidden and visible.  
 
In a Deleuzian perspective, this could be expected, as control is incomplete, as machines only 
temporarily and incompletely interrupt flows and as these interruptions cause new desires leading to 
new flows unobserved in and by the machine, to new rhizomatic relations, leading to new objects and 
subjects (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983; 1987). This leads to de-territorializations and re-territorializations 
which remain unobserved but could become the starting point of a new line of flight and hence a new 
assemblage, in which everything can be remade. Machines are limited in their effects by the resistance 
they create and the partial incompatibility with the deeper realities of what they organize; Deleuze 
speaks of bodies without organs, of a reality ultimately made up of flows. In a more narrow sense, in 
terms of organization and state, one can say that the state machine never fully coincides with the 
community it claims to represent and hopes to shape. Its circuitry may emerge out of the community, 
but leads its own life and the rhizomatic production of new assemblages can never be fully observed or 
controlled. If observed, the connections made, the interpretations given and actions derived, are a 
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product of the machine itself, and stay within the world of the machine. Mobilities are bound to remain 
invisible and the less tuned into the configuration of flows and desire in society, the more resistance 
mobilities provoked and the less visible they can be. 
Silent acknowledgment of incomplete control 
The silent acknowledgment of the Soviet regime in later years of its inability to fully manage identity 
construction and all forms of mobility, and its acknowledgment of [semi-]hidden mobilities and 
coordination to deal with some of its problems, an acknowledgment that came after years of 
overestimation of control, still proved to be a problematic response in the end. A Deleuzian Soviet 
leader might have seen that hidden coordination and mobilities, as well as the infrastructures that make 
them possible and expandable, silently erode all boundaries, creating new rhizomatic connections 
between unexpected places, objects, ideas and creating new planes to look at reality, new perspectives 
which render the given reality even less persuasive, and offer possibilities for new mechanic 
assemblages, new configurations of knowledge, power and materiality which produce new realities, and 
new lines of flight, breaking open epistemic spaces and inserting new concepts that undermine the old 
fabric (Pottage, 2004; Massey, 2005, also Alff et al. submitted).  
Central Asia: internal margin and darling of Soviet development 
Central Asia was far and close from the political center and this combination had effects on their post- 
Soviet trajectories. It was far from the center in a geographical sense and in the sense that the 
traditional societies there had little affinity with the thoroughly Europeanized Russia that invaded in the 
second half of the 19th century and its Soviet successor. It was also represented as the internal ‘Other’ 
in Soviet popular culture. On the other hand, the sparsely populated regions of Central Asia, lacking 
strong political entities for centuries and loose and shifting ethnic identifications in most areas, were 
probably the most thoroughly reinvented in the Soviet mold (Amsler 2007).  Moscow built an extensive 
infrastructure of roads, irrigation canals, but also schools, collective farms, villages (in previously semi- 
nomadic areas) and research institutes and universities. Small scale communities became sedentary, and 
integrated in larger scale frameworks of scientific and economic production, with science supporting 
economic decision-making. Local governments in the agricultural areas were de facto the kolkhoz 
governments, whereas in other areas, the local government and party branches that were nominally 
central were de facto local government, coordinating the most important collectively binding decisions 
(Humphrey, 1998; Hough & Fainsod, 1979; Hahn 1988).  
 
Collectivization did certainly trigger resistance (Viola, 1999), but the nature and intensity of that 
resistance rested on a variety of factors. First of all, what was offered by the new regime in comparison 
with the old situation. It also depended on the forms of organization and scaling of the previously 
existing polities, and also on the functioning and layering of social identities. ‘Collectivization’ was not 
one process with one response and Central Asia was not one place, nor a collection of pre-defined 
identities and polities. Cities often had longer histories than polities, ethnic identities were sometimes 
relevant, sometimes not, the new regime related to different places and identities different than to 
others. Sometimes, tribal coalitions were very loose and feudal structures as well, while in other cases, 
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villages identities and clan identities were structuring belonging very strongly and with deep histories. 
Especially in irrigated areas receiving much investment and harboring only small scale social identities, 
there could be openings for cooperation and cooptation. Clans, extended families, villages, could be 
easily transformed into collective farms, and leaders of larger social formations could be integrated into 
bureaucratic structures, could become local or regional party secretary − raicom or obcom (Luong-Jones, 
2002; Collins, 2006).  
 
Central Asia was thus also, for a while, a darling of the social engineering-minded elites of the USSR, 
because it was a region where more space for experiment existed, where the path of development was 
less determined by older actor/institution and power/knowledge configurations. After a while, they also 
produced local and regional Soviet elites, with Tashkent as the major political, economic and scientific 
center for Central Asia, harboring among other things the main cotton, water and irrigation institutes, as 
well as the largest irrigation projects and agricultural populations. Central Asia provided spaces for 
heroism, scientific and economic and even now older engineers recount fondly the heroic days of the 
Hunger Steppes project. Former kolkhoz managers and experts, and people in project organizations 
remember the possibility of a multiplicity of career paths in the region. Indeed, few made it to Moscow 
(cf. Jones-Luong, 2002; Hough & Fainsod, 1979), but the mobility in Soviet Central Asia was remarkably 
higher compared to the previous centuries. Tsarist Central Asia was for most purposes still feudal, and 
before that, the political entities dominating the area were mostly facades, relying on local lords to 
maintain a semblance of unity. The Soviet structures allowed for learning, traveling, shifting careers, 
networking, learning the rules of the new game in different positions (Stoner-Weiss, 1997; Friedgut & 
Hahn, 1994). Much was new, but old networks, mobilized in early Soviet days, were made important 
again in the Soviet system and even with all new elements and embedded in a new and larger systems, 
many local and regional identity structures were maintained (Ruble et al., 2001) The region, as the 
oblast level, became the scale of careerism and the de facto site of identification for many, if not most, a 
scale that also still allowed a sense of continuity with older forms of networks.  
 
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, these new elites not only succeeded in navigating the Soviet networks but also 
using them for private gain, and the accent shifted more and more towards that negative aspect of 
informal coordination (Collins, 2006; Adams, 1999 ). To the extent that in the mid-1980’s, in the middle 
of perestroika, an era when central controls in general loosened, Gorbachev initiated a crackdown on 
cotton producing areas rife with corruption. It was that period, when local autonomy  was reduced, that 
left a mark on the collective memory in Uzbekistan and created for some an association between 
communism and oppression – rather than the period where the communist system worked more or less 
the way it was supposed to work. In the center, partly corrupted itself, the region became more and 
more associated with corruption, systematic abuse and the erosion of the Soviet system of planned rural 
economy (Critchlow, 1988; Urinboyev & Svenssion, 2013). 
 
For Deleuze, what was made anew was everything in the Soviet Union. Continuity could indeed be 
observed, but the clans, families, tribes that were reinvigorated by means of kolkhoz and higher 
administration structures, were also thoroughly transformed in the process. The larger scale social 
identities involved, associated with titular groups representing a republic, were in most cases solidified 
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in Soviet days, in some cases largely constructed then. The contact with new places, rules, identities, 
forms of knowledge, materialities and forms of organization (e.g. the village in country sides that never 
saw such assemblage) opened new worlds, made a new world, in which each element cannot be traced 
back simply to one old element, but only through a set of transformations in contact with the other 
elements of the rhizomatic possibilities of Soviet mobility. While the plan for Soviet society in Central 
Asia might have been rigidly stratified, the actual movements of bodies, ideas, objects, and their new 
encounters, guided by the plans but various other informalities and contingencies, opened up different 
virtualities, actualized in different mobilities.  
Soviet breakup: new boundaries, scales, mobilities 
When the USSR was about to break up, it was Moscow that wanted to get rid of many of the republics, 
not in the least the Central Asian ones. The hidden Soviet mobilities did surface in the center, when it 
could not hold anymore, but there was still an option of shedding the costly and corrupt region. Russia 
and Ukraine could not support Central Asia anymore and Central Asia had contributed to the erosion of 
the Center itself – this was the common perception. In the other direction, all Central Asian republics 
overwhelmingly voted to stay within the USSR, even when it was clear for a while in the European USSR 
that things were falling apart (Collins, 2006). The strident nationalism of the post-Soviet years in virtually 
all the Central Asian republics was thus a quick manufacture, an ad hoc response to a need for rapid re- 
consolidation of power at the republican level (Batuman, 2010).  
 
Very quickly, ethnic identities, histories were rewritten or re-codified, from the perspective of now 
independent nations (Adams, 2010, 1999; Beissinger, 1992; Batuman, 2010; Usta, 2007), expected to be 
coherent in and by themselves, expected to possess a cultural and ethnic core traceable in the distant 
past, a history of successes and great men, achievements in all domains and fiercely defended borders, 
markers of difference in political, legal, economic and cultural sense. The new political borders were 
often based on Soviet-produced versions (Ruble et al., 2001; Jones-Luong, 2002), but their function 
shifted and in general they hardened, as the new republics could now be more autonomous, harshly 
delineated, and more completely controlled from the centers of the former republics (Alff, submitted; 
Friedgut & Hahn, 1994; Remnick, 1997). This level of control increased even more where the collective 
farms were dismantled, and the new figure of the individual farmer was confronted with an 
emboldened regional power center (Allina-Pisano, 2008; Trevisani, 2008).  
 
The mobilities spurred by the construction of the USSR, some officially encouraged, others tolerated, yet 
others invisible or impossible to stop, transformed with the breakup of the Union (Alff/Benz, 2014). The 
officially encouraged ones largely disappeared, while the tolerated ones, in many cases linked with 
beneficial informalities show a more scattered pattern, depending on the pathway of development in 
different areas. The harmful invisible ones yet continue to proliferate, used to operate in difficult 
conditions. Often, large enterprises were split in pieces, fell into disarray. When they survived, in Central 
Asia they usually fell under more direct political control than before, reducing their function as 
potentially corrective or sheltering micro-environments. Kolkhozi were mostly dismantled, and where 
they survived, their power as local government was usually reduced (Ioffe et al., 2006). Depending on 
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the area, local governments could become more powerful (Uzbekistan, Ukraine) and in some of those 
cases, they could reinvigorate some old collective farms, sometimes amounting to a form of power 
sharing, as in Ukraine (Allina-Pisano, 1998; Verdery, 2003).  
 
In a Deleuzian perspective, the collapse of the USSR does not mean a collapse of the state and a partial 
return to reinvented clan and ethnic identities does not amount to a return to nomadic thought or 
practice. The nomad was always a metaphorical nomad for Deleuze and the organization of space and 
society was a necessity for the reproduction of desirable forms of society, for the production in the 
modern world of social identities that can become desiring machines, harboring collective affects and 
allowing for individual lines of flight (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Its lack of flexibility made it collapse, the 
lack of options for self-transformation, the lack of mythologies that were believable enough to 
transform identities, to direct action, to create desire in directions deemed attainable within society. It 
relied on an impossible repetition of the same, a negative line of flight. Structures are needed, 
sometimes as new starting points for further experiments. Structures are in themselves neither good 
nor bad, and no set of boundaries or scales is in itself superior to others. For Deleuze, their productivity 
is essential, their life-denying or life-affirming character (Deleuze, 1983; 1993). A plateau is needed, a 
new consistency which can produce new lines of flights, new mechanic assemblages, new virtualities. 
Paper realities for Deleuze, as in narratives, identities, rules and roles that lose their persuasive 
character, but are nevertheless reproduced, are in many cases harmful, not passive. They can make it 
harder to reinvent society in a structured manner; if dead institutions are simply reproduced for the 
state’s sake, this, in rhizomatic fashion, will affect in the end all identities, boundaries and scales, and 
reduce the virtual plane, essential to self-transformation in new directions.   
New states, new mobilities 
The pathways are manifold, but in general one can say that the former republics, partly by default 
(transformation, chaos) and partly by design (creating power bases) tried to consolidate power, increase 
control over the smaller scales, harden the new state boundaries, control physio-spatial mobilities, and 
bring back the attempts at managing epistemic mobilities from the early Soviet days. The state- 
sponsored nationalism of the Central Asian countries has less to do with pre-existing ethnic cores, 
histories and aspirations, than with late Soviet elites trying to create autonomous and controllable 
domains with early Soviet means (Suny, 1995). These means, as in the old days, have their limitations, 
just as social engineering as such has limitations and the forms of mobility described above play a part.  
 
The new stories were in many cases not very persuasive, precisely because the stories and the 
institutionalization of the propaganda resembled too much the Soviet approach and people were 
familiar with it. Many people had developed an instinct for images of reality conjured by power for the 
sake of power (Hornidge et al. 2013). They had developed strategies to believe in alternative realities, 
and to navigate political and economic networks in such a way that the most oppressive aspects of new 
regimes could be avoided, and new opportunities spotted. The regimes, on the other hand, were just as 
familiar with the parallel worlds that existed in the USSR, the hidden mobilities and their corrosive 
powers. Thus one gets into a precarious rhetorical and political balance, where nobody believes the 
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official narratives on anything, nobody assumes that laws and plans are good and will be implemented, 
yet nobody knows when formal rules will have an impact. Different sections of the elites, and the elites 
(largely in government) and citizens hold each other hostage. Hidden mobilities are more necessary than 
ever, because Soviet opportunities are gone, no clear economic alternative is offered, and because the 
state is often parasitic, yet hiding them is more difficult.  
 
Specialization is generally reduced, functional and organizational differentiation are being undermined 
by reliance on informal coordination under the radar, in networks that can be clan-based, family-based, 
ethnic-based or tied to local/regional business interests (Van Assche et al., 2013b). Short term survival 
and adaptation then decreases the stability of the community and its development potential in the long 
run (Hornidge et al. 2014, forthcoming). Indeed, the whole economic, bureaucratic and scientific 
apparatus of the Soviet era could no longer be sustained by the new, much poorer, Central Asian 
regimes (cf. Wegren, 1989), further hampered by the struggle for control over resources by factions 
within and behind government, based on factional interest in short-term profits, versus investments and 
long-term community benefits. 
The ensuing mobilities had to be invisible largely, as the state and its allies (including banks) could not be 
trusted and for the state, the incentive to crack down and profit from them became ever larger because 
realistic taxation systems supporting collective services had not been developed (Kornai/Rose- 
Ackerman, 2004; Ruble et al, 2001).  
 
Thus, in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, making money is dangerous, showing it or investing it openly 
even more so. Owning land is very useful (in the form of long-term leases, or technically illegal 
subleases), but the meaning of ownership can change overnight as rules or their enforcement change 
(Eichholz et al., 2013). Living somewhere closer to economic opportunity is risky as probably one cannot 
get a residence permit (Tashkent is an example). Traveling within the country can be difficult because of 
restrictions; crossing borders for migrant work or trade is problematic, since the relations between 
countries are shaky and unpredictable and as the trade and taxation per country is unpredictable. All 
this drives mobilities even more into hiding, and reduces incentives for investment, skill development, 
and long-term visions (cf. in this working paper series: Steenberg, 2014; Ismailbekova, 2013a; Kuzibaeva, 
2014, forthcoming). It also reinforces the reliance on informal networks that have to be monitored 
constantly.   
 
Migration, internal economic mobility, criminal mobility, is all linked to a situation with limited economic 
opportunity, state capture, absent rule of law and incomplete control (Acemoglu/Robinson, 2012; 
Easterly, 2006). Physio-spatial, social and epistemic boundaries and the lines between scales are 
redrawn in the process of coping with this situation (cf. Ismailbekova, 2013b), in the hidden mobilities 
sparked off by coping strategies. Thus, one can say that for the USSR time and for the post-Soviet era, it 
is true that the regimes and their institutional design caused mobilities but also suppressed mobilities, 
driving mobilities into the invisible, making them less easy to manage, and less productive in the 
(legitimate) self-transformation of society. A circle of oppressive use of power is initiated in many places, 
whereas elsewhere, the structures of power collapse and with that, some of their beneficial effects 
(protection, collective goods, services).  
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Thus, in Deleuzian perspective, the post-Soviet mobilities are hidden for partly new and partly old 
reasons. The fact of invisibility per se is not a problem, the reliance on largely informal institutions 
neither. The changing map of social identities, the loss of an imperial center, is not to be deplored. Old 
restrictions have been lifted and others have been imposed, on all three mobilities. The new states are 
smaller assemblages and in some cases the actually productive assemblages, functioning as desiring 
machines, are only to be found at smaller scales. Life itself is not optimally organized in one 
configuration, marked by one set of scales and boundaries and mobilities transversing them, but the 
productivity of the configuration is what counts, for Deleuze a reproduction which brings difference and 
repetition, difference by means of repetition of interactions between rules and roles, between narrative 
and material elements. Micro-politics and micro-resistance are not past but future for Deleuze (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1994) and this can take place in any size of polity. Yet (cf. Hardt, 1993; De Landa, 2002), 
existence is coexistence of virtual and actual multiplicities and if the virtual becomes largely 
disconnected from the actual, the unfolding of individual and collective bodies, become thoroughly 
restricted; one can distinguish between a disconnect between virtual and actual and a reduction of the 
virtual per se, in the form of cynicism and oppression reducing the variety of imaginable individual and 
collective futures. Certain patterns of invisible mobilities, associated with specific configurations of 
formal/informal institutions can therefore be considered harmful for the social body and its future.   
 
In the following sections, we go deeper into the Tajik and Uzbek cases, without attempting to fully map 
the patterns of mobility. This is beyond our present scope and the aim of this paper. We refer to the 
literature, including our previous work and rather present the cases as series of illustrations of the 
previous analysis and the mechanisms mentioned there.  
4. Uzbek Mobilities 
Mobilities and the immobility of irrigation systems and production quota 
In Uzbekistan, millions of people live off irrigated agriculture and this agriculture is highly technical, 
dependent on an elaborate physical, organizational and scientific infrastructure dating mostly from the 
early Soviet period (for an overview over the water management system, see Hornidge et al. 2011a). 
After independence, the maintenance of the physical and organisational infrastructure was largely 
neglected, while scientific content production fared even worse (Wall, 2008; Veldwisch, 2008). 
Collective farms were dismantled in steps, making the local government, under leadership of the hokim, 
more important, and, as mentioned, a new class of quasi-autonomous farmers, or fermers was created, 
consisting of former kolkhoz management but also people with various backgrounds and some money 
or connections (Veldwisch/Spoor, 2008). The majority of former kolkhoz employees lost their jobs and 
many former career and learning tracks in the Soviet space (i.e. from the tractor mechanic in rural 
Uzbekistan to Tashkent, Moscow or a Sovkhoz in Kazakhstan) closed off. Thus, these mobilities 
disappeared, as the framework of Soviet agriculture disappeared (cf. Friedgut/Hanhn, 1994; Ioffe et al., 
2006), resulting in substantial (seasonal) labor migration of the (largely male) young to Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, sometimes China, as well as various forms of cross-border trade .  
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Those who stay in agriculture work under a state plan on cotton and wheat with sale at fixed prices to 
the state (Veldwisch, 2008; Hornidge et al. 2011; Hornidge et al. 2013). While of strategic importance to 
the government (cotton as main export product of Uzbekistan) there are little immediate benefits for 
the individual farmer (i.e. no cash income but merely income on account with access controlled by the 
government). This nevertheless looks very different in the field of rice production, not regulated by the 
state plan, but instead a locally marketed and consumed product. Here for the individual farmer 
interesting margins can be achieved, if he/she can free the land used for rice production from the state 
plan (i.e. for reasons of high salinization degrees) or keep the rice production out of sight of government 
actors. Informal coordination of production is thus required and since the rice starts as ‘informal’ 
product, several other steps in the chain towards consumption are likely to be informally coordinated. 
Trying to stay under the radar of government is virtually impossible, but one can try to be visible only for 
a few local government actors and ensure their help to stay out of reach for the rest. If there are other 
ties, beyond occasional bribes, this can help to stabilize this relationship and so networks grow that can 
create space for hidden mobilities at the local level. These networks in consequence contribute to a 
reshuffling of social identities, a redrawing of social boundaries (Oberkircher/Hornidge 2011; Hornidge 
et al. 2013; Eichholz et al. 2013).  
Building Networks / Redrawing social boundaries  
If we go back to the local level, and to the distinction farmer under stateplan/subsistent farmers and 
peasants (in Uzbek: fermer/dekhqan), one can uncover a few more mechanisms reigning the pattern of 
hidden mobilities. Fermers can lose their land, if they lose favor with political elites and/or clan/elite. 
Dekhqans lose their job on the fermer’s land, or their sublease, if they don’t get along with the fermer. 
Dekhqans can be involved in small trade at local markets. Sharecropping arrangements can allow to 
accumulate resources and engage more in trade; or subleases can be obtained of plots with decent 
fertility and water provision. Relations with the own fermer, with other fermers, with service providers, 
or market relations can stabilize the production on those lands, and local political relations can help in 
accessing useful networks, in some cases in sheltering semi-legal sales (Veldwisch 2008, Trevisani 2010, 
Shtaltovna 2013).  
 
The need of fermers for skilled workers, their dependence on them in many cases and the need of 
dekhqans of services and shelter, encourage the creation of new networks, networks in turn assisting 
hidden mobilities (Oberkircher/Hornidge 2011). Money coming in from family members, sometimes 
remittances from the diaspora, can help in the business activities. One can speak here of a wide variety 
of forms of cooperation and contracts, mostly short-term, of constant experimentation, of old and new 
networks at the local scale, and of, as yet modest, hidden mobilities. Because there is no open land 
market, no private property of land, dekhqans cannot openly take over whole farms, as in fermers’ 
operations, but they can become more important in trade, they can accumulate money, buy houses, 
become small scale landlords, employ their own people etc.  
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In some cases, this can mean a reliance on pre-existing but less relevant ties, in other cases new ties, 
new networks and new group identities are created in the flow of hidden mobilities. In the case of new 
identities, there can still be a reference to older identities or a pretense of survival of an old identity 
(Trevisani, 2010). Families can become more extended families and when symbolic kinship starts to play 
a role one can speak more of clans. Other clans do not refer to family mythologies but to a shared ethnic 
or regional past, while yet others consciously style themselves as factions sharing business interests 
(Collins, 2006). Local clans are embedded in or associated with clans at a higher level, at different scales, 
and the presidency can in fact be described as a mediator’s role, mediating between powerful clans. The 
mobilities in and between the clans are not entirely visible, also not for other clans, as the relation is 
usually competitive.  
The networks shaped by the clans and the ties of reciprocity, obligation and loyalty that are cultivated 
within them, are an important infrastructure for hidden mobilities (Kuzibaeva, forthcoming; Steenberg, 
2014). In some cases, clans hollow out the state, either by capturing it, or by rendering it powerless. 
They ignore and redraw boundaries of various sorts, and their importance, as new or emboldened social 
identities is already a strong sign that social boundaries have been redrawn (Alff et al. submitted).  
 
After the Soviet era, the regime in Uzbekistan became more authoritarian and many career paths were 
closed off for people outside the right families, clans, networks, but at the same time, necessity persists, 
and the need for food, water, land, and for cotton money, ensures that also outside these clans, other 
informalities and hidden mobilities mushroom (Van Assche et al. 2013, Hornidge et al. 2013). It also 
creates access to these networks, when newer small-scale successful families or factions become 
embedded in pre-existing larger networks, with small and large feeding off each other.  
Risks of visibility and visibility for whom? 
Success is a risk in this situation and this forms another obstacle for long term strategy and investment. 
Money has to be sheltered. Successful operations become more visible, because more are involved, 
because more land and water is taken, because more money and products are circulating, and then 
transaction costs rise. More people have to be bribed, a higher percentage of goods and profits has to 
be written off, expected to be lost somewhere in the chain. Higher levels, or competing social groups 
will notice your success, interested in skimming off any profitable business (in taking it over, or crushing 
it because of competition with the own business ventures). At a certain point, a choice has to be made, 
or will be forced: stopping, scaling back, working harder on invisibility, buying more official support, or, 
trying to become part of the establishment and participating in the controlling gaze.  
 
Then, however, the question pops up what the establishment is, and how established it is. It is not very 
stable. Some regional clans have existed since Soviet times, others emerged right after independence, at 
smaller scales, the landscape of networks is more varied and changing. Some families have dominated a 
town for generations, while suddenly a new clan emerges, out of successful business ventures, with a 
few different political connections. Suddenly, someone can buy the hokim position, or be dropped in 
there from a higher level clan.  
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Many hokims are fired after a few years, either because they are perceived as a threat by the powers 
that launched them initially, or because at a higher level the balance of power changed. They can also be 
fired because their bribery was too rampant, not acceptable anymore for the locals and the higher 
authorities. This, too, is a self- reinforcing mechanism, a positive feedback loop: if hokims know that 
they can be fired easily, and pay a lot for their position the tendency to make money quickly is 
understandable, even if it contributes to their own demise.  They cannot calculate the odds anyway 
(many ancient Roman public offices were sold, and similar mechanisms were prevalent). Downward 
mobility in an authoritarian regime can be very steep and the landing can be hard; one can end up in 
prison, lose one’s possessions. Hokims, but also fermers can lose everything, end up destitute. Network 
protection becomes even more important then, to reduce the chances of this happening.  
5. Tajik Mobilities 
A history of marginality and recent fragmentation 
Tajikistan is a quite different case. The country is more mountainous, more remote, on average less 
fertile. In some valleys, there is irrigated cotton production, as in Uzbekistan, and in these areas, a 
system similar to the Uzbek one emerged, with politics and economy dominated by the ‘cotton elites’ 
(Boboyorov, 2012; Johnson, 2006). Cotton, as in Uzbekistan, is preferred because it brings in hard 
currency and because its profits are easy to siphon off.  In some mountain areas, kolkhozi never took off. 
In others, they did take root and there usually the local kolkhoz management retained an important role 
in politics and economy afterwards. The local kolkhoz elites seem more contested (and contestable) 
than the cotton elites operating elsewhere and at higher levels. In this process of local contestation, 
various alternative identities and forms of organization are called upon, from family and ethnic loyalties 
over regional identities to −not in the least− different forms of Muslim identity and associated rules 
(Jones Luong, 2004; Thibault, 2013). Village councils exist in many places but do not always play an 
important role in collective decision-making. Sometimes they are powerful but de facto dominated by 
the kolkhoz elites or by one family. In other cases, they function more or less democratically, in yet 
other cases they perform a ritual of community, without real decisions ever being taken (Boboyorov, 
2013; cf Taubman, 1973; Hahn, 1988). As agriculture here is even more tenuous than in Uzbekistan, 
access to land and water is even more crucial. Certain versions of Islamic law emerge and are utilized in 
local competition, that have a bearing on precisely these points; special reference has to be made to a 
law governing the inheritance of lands from grandparents (Boboyorov, 2012). Agricultural service 
provision was less developed than in the Uzbek SSR, and after independence, even less was left 
(Shtaltovna, 2013). 
 
What enables this diversity in local governance, and this reference to competing identities and 
competing sets of institutions, is the splintering of the state (cf Ioffe, 2006; Ruble et al, 2001; Kavalski, 
2013). Tajikistan is less than Uzbekistan a nation state, if we understand this concept to refer to a 
centralized state, with clear boundaries, a political and economic center, uniform and enforceable laws, 
an unambiguous governance structure (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). In Tajikistan, the civil war that 
followed independence further undermined the fragile unity of the former SSR, and what is left now can 
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be described as a weak central government, with incomplete control over the borders and the territory, 
with strong ties to (and partly overlapping with) the cotton elites, and a government apparatus that is 
scattered geographically and topically and largely used for extractive and parasitic purposes.  
 
Because western states and organizations are used and obliged often to deal with ‘the government’, 
they paradoxically keep in place a system that hinders reinvention (cf Ferguson, 1994). Western contacts 
are valuable, these can be obtained and exploited in the current structure and once a position is taken, 
this position and the system itself cannot be questioned or transformed easily. At the same time, the 
increased local autonomy created a lobby-group that cannot easily be ignored anymore, that cannot be 
easily be forced into a uniform mold (Van Assche et al., 2013b; Elster et al, 1998).  
Drivers of mobilities: positive and negative 
Mobilities then look a little different than in Uzbekistan. Local communities in most parts of the country 
changed a lot, transformed much, and this implies social, cognitive and physical mobility. Tajikistan is 
even more depleted of labor and intellect by mass migration to Russia, Kazakhstan and China (Jonson, 
2013). Movement within the country is less restricted than in Uzbekistan and residence permits are less 
meaningful. In USSR times, the career ladders in rural areas were less developed than in Uzbekistan, and 
what existed, fragmented even more. Expertise is even more rare. Mobility as change of communities, 
received a stronger negative motivation, as the struggle for survival was harder and a stronger positive 
impetus, as more change was allowed, more institutional experimentation, more movement of people 
and ideas, more reference to competing identities and rules.  
 
Other players were allowed onto the scene, and here the NGO sector deserves special mention 
(Shtaltovna, 2013; Hornidge et al., 2014a, forthcoming). Partly because of the geopolitical importance of 
Tajikistan, partly because of the institutional vacuum, a rich and diverse NGO sectors settled down in the 
country, sometimes with clearly political ties, sometimes with clear ties to certain perspectives on 
economic and political development, sometimes more pragmatic, or focused on smaller issues. The NGO 
sector was and is not unified and the concomitant focus on projects and their objectives and 
deliverables makes it hard and undesirable to re-crystallize governance around them.  
 
They do introduce new mobilities, as the capital and infrastructure enable social mobility and their 
activities introduce new ideas, knowledge mobilities. As in other cases, physical, social and intellectual 
mobilities are entwined, and working for an NGO requires more travel, learning, and a route for social 
climbing. People with knowledge of English and of western ways in general gain an advantage, and 
people with prominent positions in the previous system become suddenly apprentices of new trainers, 
new NGO’s, with relatively little local knowledge (Hornidge et al., 2014a). This causes friction and de 
facto a downward social mobility for others.  
 
As said, this does not affect all people with a position of influence in the old system; at local and national 
level, the major political and economic players still come from the old elites, and the higher level elites 
also use the NGO sector for their own purposes, either to parasitize directly, or to create opportunities 
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for themselves and their families, or for business improvement. Thus, the NGO sector at once keeps 
parts of the old elite in the saddle, and pushes other parts down. Those who lose ground already did so 
in the Tajik power games. Climbing very high through the NGO career ladder, without other 
connections, at this point seems very rare. A further step for people climbing the NGO ladder is often 
migration, to another NGO, a scientific institute, to the headquarter or another office of the same 
organization.  
 
With the stronger erosion of Soviet infrastructure in Tajikistan, in intellectual and physical sense, and in 
the sense of offering career tracks (fewer organizations are left and are more in disarray), the effects on 
social memory are also different than in Uzbekistan. There, more ways are still present to transfer 
attitudes, knowledge, strategies, concepts pertaining to Soviet society and economy, while in Tajikistan 
the younger generations are less influenced by that past configuration of mobilities. And, as other side 
of the coin, by the past set of boundaries and scales. Both opportunity and limitation have been 
transformed to a higher degree.  
Fragmented structures present new freedoms and new limitations 
The state itself offered opportunities now gone, through its internal structure and flows and its absence 
offers opportunities, through new flows and vanished barriers. While the old structures also created 
ladders to climb and roads to travel. Absence in memory makes it harder to reinvent, to go back, 
absence in organizational structure and resources contribute to this (Weiner, 1999; Van Assche et al., 
2009). The disappearing of political, economic structures and infrastructures makes it easier for new 
social boundaries to appear (Eriksen 2002; Pratt, 1999). In the case of Tajikistan, this often amounts to 
different versions of reinvention of tradition, usually in manners that are economically and politically 
advantageous for the inventors. Local political networks can be made more ‘Tajik’, more ‘Muslim’, more 
circled around the ‘big man’, more identified with a family or clan. In now more localized political 
games, players realign themselves according to the most stable local elite and their rules of the game.  
 
Mobilities are less hidden than in Uzbekistan, since there is a more open competition between social 
identities, between associated rule sets and less coordinative (and oppressive) power of the state. This 
extends to the definition and functioning of criminal networks. Just as other networks, they tend to 
perpetuate themselves, but in the Tajik case, more than in most post- Soviet places, all players are doing 
things that can be called criminal. In the senses that law cannot always be enforced, that it does not 
always exist, that it can be written for private gain, or by criminals, that players combine various 
activities, some more hidden than others, that different rules can suddenly apply. ‘Law’ and therefore 
legality and illegality acquire unstable meanings and the state that can stabilize expectations according 
to a stable rule set does not expect (Luhmann, 2004; Rosen, 2008).  
 
What remains are islands of economic and political competition tied together by a few economic 
networks, some apparently legal (cotton), some clearly illegal (narcotics, trafficking, weapons smuggle), 
and by a loosely coupled sector of NGO’s and other organizations supported by foreign money. This is 
quite far removed from the traditional western idea of a nation state, and the functioning of external 
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boundaries and internal scales should not expected to be similar to a western nation state. One of the 
rare mechanisms keeping communities and the state together are negative notions of conflict and 
positive notions of harmony which seem to pervade most places and groups, and can effectively be 
invoked when tensions rise too much, e.g. at village councils (Boboyorov, 2012; Mandler, 2013; ).   
6. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper, we have explored the potential of the concept set of : 
 
- mobilities (social, spatial, conceptual),  
- boundaries (social, spatial, concepual),  
- scales, and  
- formal/informal institutions  
 
to compare the post-Soviet transitions of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in particular the rural areas, and 
with special attention to what we called ‘hidden mobilities’, changes that remained under the radar. We 
articulated these concepts and their relations first in an extensive Deleuzian-inspired theoretical 
narrative. 
 
In the case analysis, we deemed the importance of hidden mobilities higher in Uzbekistan, and this was 
tied to the stronger state, its more oppressive effects, its high expectations and limited opportunities. In 
Tajikistan, only certain networks and mobilities that were strongly frowned upon abroad, by donors and 
allies, most notably the narcotics trade, were −kind of− hidden. That is, they were a public secret, and 
the signs are everywhere, but they cannot be publicly acknowledged or supported, and nobody can 
openly declare gaining from them.  
 
Also in Tajikistan, the more open competition between rule sets makes it harder to speak of formal and 
informal institutions in a stable configuration. Sometimes, there is open competition, and not one rule 
set which is expected to govern decision-making, and therefore not a clear formal/informal distinctions. 
In general, that distinction does exist, but it is a local one and the alternatives are not so much hidden 
for an all-seeing state, but used less openly in the small shade of local dominance. In other cases, such 
as in the cotton areas, there is clearly a reigning rule set, and avoidance is linked to informal institutions 
and hidden mobilities sparked by them.  
Hidden mobilities and power/knowledge configurations 
Hidden mobilities are thus tied to power, to centralized power, and to stable expectations for decision- 
making, expectations that are bucked. They are also tied to networks that grow in the shadow, in the 
shadow of power. Without power, there is no shadow and nothing to hide from. Without power, 
however, there are also fewer opportunities for open mobilities, physical, social and cognitive (Hillier, 
2002; Gledhill, 1994; Foucault, 1975, 2003; Van Assche et al., 2011). The concept of power/knowledge 
configurations is still useful then (Van Assche et al., 2013c; Beunen et al., 2014). Power/knowledge 
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configurations guide and create mobilities, in all senses; they pattern the linkages between knowledge 
and the other mobilities (Thrift, 2006). Splintering of power is also splintering of knowledge; over- 
concentration of power often brings often overly dominant or hegemonic discourses. Yet absence of 
power in its organized forms makes it difficult to maintain an open competition between actors and 
between discourses and for any of them to survive beyond the local level (Patton, 2000; Nakaya, 2009). 
 
Local autarky can bring indeed perfect local democracy, participation, mobilization of local knowledge, 
but it can also bring highly closed clan rule, internal closure and external hostility, sharp local social and 
cognitive boundaries, a very suffocating environment (cf Mansfield, 1993; Luhmann, 1990). It can also 
make it tough to climb the ladder in a structured manner, learning, competing according to accepted 
rules (cf Seabright, 2010; Seidl, 2005) and often the only routes of social mobility left are crime, 
submission or simply leaving, which does not contribute much to the further stabilization or 
development of the community (Shtaltovna et al, 2012; Sanghera & Ilyasov, 2008; Sahadea & Zanca, 
2007).  
Boundaries are constantly recreated in and by mobilities. Mobilities and hidden mobilities do not only 
erode boundaries, they create, on purpose and unwittingly new ones, and this also applies to the 
construction of spatial scales, of boundaries between levels of territory. In Uzbekistan, the 
reconfiguration of power within a strong hull of Soviet infrastructure made the scales of hokimiat more 
important, while blurring older lines and scales inherited from Soviet times. In Tajikistan, the scale of the 
local community, whatever its actual size, became overall more important, while other scales 
diminished in importance, to the extent that they do not exist anymore in many respects. Again, 
reconfiguration of power is reconfiguration of networks, of boundaries and scales, with changes in one 
type of boundary likely to cause changes in the other types (Dagiev, 2013; Papastergiadis, 2000; Shields, 
2013). And power playing a role comparable to fire and structure at the same time: it represents a risk 
but is necessary; it is both constraining and enabling (Foucault, 1975). Power/ knowledge, as coupled 
entities without meaning by themselves, affect the other couplings, between boundaries, scales and 
hence social identities. 
 
Power needs knowledge and knowledge needs power; and knowledge is permeated by power in 
manners that can never be fully elucidated, i.e.clarified without affecting positions of power and 
knowledge perspectives one is situated in (Foucault, 1968). Power also needs structure to reproduce 
and expand and it needs more knowledge in the process of expansion (Foucault, 1975; 2003). This 
process cements social identities and possible mobilities, but it also creates entities that can move, and 
infrastructures and scales and knowledge that can be reused, reinterpreted, twisted, and made to work 
in unanticipated ways (Whatmore, 2006; Thrift, 2008; Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). Power creates a world 
of abuse but also of use, it creates a world one can navigate in and the tools to navigate it. In a 
Deleuzian perspective, this Foucaultian insight becomes even more radical, when mobilities are seen as 
intensely entwined and able to create new realities in and by themselves (Deleuze, 1988a; Zizek, 2008).  
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Hidden mobilities and the post- Soviet condition: elite games and the rest 
In the post- Soviet world, the splintering of the USSR, its partial replacement in different ways in each of 
the republics, and the transformation of actors, institutions and networks in unique manners, offers a 
unique set of experiments, a unique window into the entangling of mobilities. The scale and the concept 
of the nation state is not always useful indeed and the scale of ‘Central Asia’, is not always relevant. 
Similarly, the distinction between formal and informal institutions is not always relevant, and is made 
differently according to the context, and the pattern of mobilities. It is still useful however, as, just as 
with boundaries, new formalities and their informalities are constantly created as de- territorialization 
leads again into phases of re-territorialization. In most post- Soviet states, elites emerged that have 
something to do with the previous elites but cannot be reduced to them (Schoeberlein, 1994; Suny, 
1995; Critchlow, 1988). There is path dependence but not only that. The primal mobility in the 
emergence of these states was the emergence, rise and consolidation of these elites, using state assets 
and connections, in combination often with criminal connections and informal networks, in some cases 
with western aspirations, knowledge and linkages (Ledeneva, 2013; Bissell, 2010; Remnick, 1997; Ruble, 
1995). This mobility was primal in the sense that it was foundational; most other things derived and 
were framed by them. Where no clear outcome emerge, as in Tajikistan, the state fragmented, driving 
people either to the local scale or into exile.   
 
Where clear winners emerged, where an elite consolidated, maybe as clan alliance as in Uzbekistan (or, 
in lighter version, Ukraine), mobilities were redefined and restricted. In case the state required much 
but did not offer much, mobilities were necessary but more hidden and a clear distinction between 
formal and informal institutions stabilized. In cases where laws and rules could change unexpectedly, 
and are applied unevenly, this made time horizons with most players shorter, and pushed even more 
mobilities into hiding, making the infrastructures of hidden mobility, such as networks, even more 
entrenched.  
 
For Deleuze, beings are not elements then entering into relations of power, and wholes e.g. social 
wholes, do not pre- exist elements. Neither the element nor the whole is essential in the analysis of 
communities; beings are forces, forces create relations and sets of relations can create assemblages and 
machinic assemblages. Power is the power to, and beings are becomings because they are first of all 
powers in motion, reshaping relations reshaping larger wholes. Power most often associated with the 
state is reactive power, intending to keep something in place which cannot be kept the same and 
hampering the unfolding of creative rhizomes. States create subjectivities which are needed to 
reproduce the rhizome, but keeping those subjectivities in one state of being, hampers its reproduction. 
Reproduction is necessarily self-transformation and the structure of rules and roles, of boundaries, 
identities and scales, is a necessity as starting point of its own reproduction.  
 
What is oppressive can therefore not easily be observed from the outside, and from the inside, there is 
no point from which to observe every place and relation. Each observation already is a contact between 
various bodies, between actual and virtual, that produces new rhizomatic connections and which 
establishes a new angle and a new whole. Once again, informality nor invisibility per se pose a problem 
 34 
or a negativity in such perspective. In post-Soviet Central Asia, one can say though that the specific 
differences between visible and invisible forms of coordination, rules and roles, makes self- 
transformation difficult in patterns which incorporate images of viable futures in a globalized world. One 
can say that some of the current regimes can survive only because of such globalized capitalism (from 
which they can derive capital). If what is truly moving people, the affects driving mobilities in the 
different forms described, cannot become visible, cannot become materialized, then this lack of 
materialization as becoming-visible and becoming-tangible, makes it harder to restructure the virtual, to 
keep the desiring machine going, to harness the expressive powers of bodies. What cannot become 
visible in this sense cannot be folded into social bodies; social affects cannot be expressed and 
materialized. In this sense, invisibility, and this form of reliance on informality, can make it hard for 
social identities to survive in meaningful ways beyond survival. ‘Society’ as a whole can easily erode 
under such conditions, and lower authoritarian pressure could easily lead to mass migration or mass 
revolt. Yet even such revolt, in Deleuzian view, cannot easily express an alternative vision, not only 
because of a prior lack of information or education, but also because the identities that are supposed to 
express alternative futures, are largely paper and reactive (survivalist) and barely capable of collective 
affects, of passions for a shared future and for a sense of such shared future.  
 
The differences between our two case countries meanwhile attest to the difficulty in assessing risk at 
this level. Invisibility in the sense analyzed above and fragmentation, as discussed above, acquire 
different forms and functions, in response to different assemblages, different legacies of rules and roles, 
of power/knowledge configurations. Where invisibility dominates, the actual state of fragmentation is 
hard to assess, as is the actual power of a central government. Where fragmentation is a more 
important obstacle to self-realization, the local differences in visibility might in the end still impact an 
emerging whole and its trajectory of unfolding.  From the scientific side, one can say that new concepts 
of statehood need to be explored, as it is obvious that new control societies are not the same as in 
Stalinist days, even when they might appear so to some outsiders, and not as in later Soviet days, even if 
they appear so (Krasner, 1984; cf Kangas,1994). Even the history of gaps between formal and informal 
institutions do not mean that current gaps have the same effects. Grasping what has happened and how 
the assemblages have transformed, means mapping what is under the radar and finding the new 
reasons and effects of invisibility. This leads to new assessments, which can only become possible if new 
affects (versus generic outcries of oppression) and new concepts (most of all new concepts of 
statehood, of scales, of entangled networks) can be explored (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). Such new 
concepts can produce new ones, make new cuts in reality, create new realities, which might, just might, 
later have effects in the places themselves, allowing for new virtualities locally, and hence new 
mobilities, lines of flight, a new machine (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). 
Post-Soviet hidden mobilities: perspectives on ‘development’ 
The Soviet empire enabled and discouraged mobilities, including its own forms of hidden mobilities, 
linked to networks and informal institutions that can only be understood by reference to the formal 
regime. When the center did not hold and the Central Asian republics reluctantly accepted their 
independence, what was carried over was diverse, including but not limited to a structural difference 
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between formal and informal institutions, hidden clans and networks, strategies to deal with scarcity 
and uneven law, as well as links in other republics. The old republics were not designed to function 
independently and they experienced hardship afterwards. People moved out of necessity, back to the 
other parts of the old Union and they relied on old strategies to survive. Yet, there was much less to take 
from, to use, to parasitize, less opportunities for business etc. This applied to the elites and to the rest. 
Elites created their own domain where they could, destroyed the domain of the state where they did 
not agree, to the detriment of themselves and all the rest. Others had to accept, to move out, to move 
in the shadows, or to rely on power games in smaller arenas. 
 
If we consider in this light the opportunities for ‘development’, the diversity of post-Soviet pathways can 
tell many things. First of all it reinforces the notion that no formula for development can be found in the 
west and applied everywhere else (cf. Easterly, 2006; North, 2005; Seabright, 2010; Scott, 1998). 
Whether the formula consists of legal and political reforms, or of knowledge or physical infrastructure, 
one cannot simply transplant it to any post-Soviet reality. Furthermore, one can observe, especially in 
Tajikistan, the limits of intervention, in the sense that NGO’s and international organizations are partly 
blinded by their own ideologies, deliverables, power games, urge to survive and in the sense that the 
splintered or hidden realities, including mobilities, do not match up with western interventions 
assuming the infrastructure, the boundaries and scales, the rule of law, of a western nation state.  
 
In terms of the functions of law, as special form of formal institutions, the patterns of mobilities 
described and analyzed for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, suggest that development efforts should be 
strongly aware of the limitations of a legal reform approach. The entanglement of mobilities as 
described (cf Cresswell, 2006, 2010; Jacobs & van Assche, 2014), the pattern of boundary and identity 
transformation (Paasi, 2002), as well as the need for mutual support of the three functions of law 
described (enabling, delimiting and upholding), make this a very unlikely route towards development, 
however understood (Easterly, 2006; Collier, 2007).   
 
Our  illustrative cases also show that mythologizing the local scale, the scale of the local community as 
the best site to do development work, to insert interventions, allowing thus for more diversity, more 
local knowledge and participation, is not a good strategy (Van Assche et al, 2011; Hahn, 1988; Buchanan, 
2006). Localism has its dark sides, just as globalism and lionizing one scale over the other does not make 
much sense analytically or practically (Swyngedouw, 2000; McCann & Ward, 2013; Marston et al, 2005). 
Especially in Tajikistan, one can also notice that localism in absence of stable institutions at higher levels 
severely hinders social justice, in whatever definition taken, social mobility, knowledge mobility and 
encourages the proliferation of criminal networks, in whatever definition preferred.  
Rethinking development given hidden mobilities = Rethinking the Nation State 
One could draw the conclusion that dropping the whole concept of the nation state and its set of 
development models should be abandoned, in favor of an approach that only considers networks or 
configurations. While we agree on the analytic value of an approach giving due space to concepts of 
network, configuration, mobilities and boundary crossing and transformation, in practical terms this 
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poses great problems. The world is organized in nation states and both the supra-national and the infra- 
national scales still assume the presence of nation states. Meanwhile, it is also clear that imposing the 
structures and necessarily underlying values (and informal institutions) of western nation states in 
Central Asia is a risky, costly and questionable approach.  
 
We cannot pretend to have simple answers here, but we do dare to say that any intervention aiming at 
knowledge, social or physical mobilities in order to further development, has to consider their 
entanglement, has to consider the centrality of power/knowledge configurations and hence of 
governance, in its current pattern, and has to consider current actor/institution configurations and their 
evolution. In some cases, this might lead to choices of intervention or support at one scale, or working 
on one type of boundary, while in other cases the result of analysis might be to leave the place and the 
community alone. Regarding the model of the western nation state, there we dare to venture that 
increased awareness in the west, in politics and in the world of development specialists, of the own 
history, and of the diversity in models of democracies and markets, might help to see more diversity in 
possible solutions to problems elsewhere and to get a more refined understanding of situations there. 
Indeed very broadly speaking, one can say that this will not completely resolve the tension between the 
model of the nation state and actually existing political configurations in Central Asia, that a continuous 
friction between models has to be accepted as part of development efforts, and that a chain of brokers 
will be needed for a long time to come, to explore which notions, resources, structures, procedures 
from the west might be desirable and workable in certain locales.  
 
Again very much in general, one can suggest that awareness of the relative fictitiousness of many 
Central Asian nation states, and of the gap between formal and formal institutions, of the hidden 
mobilities and fragmented politics, can help in assessing strategies. Awareness that nation states are 
partly fictions, can still be coupled to a rhetorical promotion of the nation state, which can have 
performative effects, create its own realities, including some of the distinct benefits of the nation state. 
An underlying strategy can then be to accept that other political configurations exist, that their 
mobilities cannot be simply suppressed or ignored, and that focus of development efforts should rather 
be on certain agreed-upon values. This can include a reference to human rights, but not necessarily. If a 
certain regime hinders social mobility, knowledge mobility and physical mobility in a manner that is 
found unacceptable by the world community, then this might be a starting point for interventions 
working in the direction of restoring flows, without losing sight of the enabling effects of political-legal 
structures, of power/ knowledge configurations (cf Baerenholdt, 2013). One can use terminology of 
justice, of fairness, of representation, without implying the machinery of most western states. 
Knowledge (cf WB, 1999) in this perspective can only have desirable  development effects if it can renew 
itself, i.e. can create new concepts and build those into new analysis. Knowledge cannot be filling in gaps 
of ‘information’ in a framework either defined by western governments or local power structures and 
taking into account hidden mobilities can help in integrating scales and boundaries differently in 
analysis. Mobilities also have to be analyzed in their material context, since materialities in a Deleuzian 
flat ontologies co-create anything else and in terms of mobilities, they co- create the landscape of 
necessity triggering mobilities and the identities evaluating that necessity (Whatmore, 2006; Thrift, 
2006). Applicable knowledge, in line with Urry’s ‘sociology without societies’ (2000) and with a 
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Deleuzian framework, follows then the scales created as relevant in mobilities, the identities, 
boundaries and concepts relevant in the becoming of communities. The resulting development 
strategies do however require, we believe, a stable institutional structure at some higher scale, beyond 
the local community, a scale allowing for mobilities, fairness and allowing for matching with 
international communities and their understandings of the world.  
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Information on the competence network Crossroads Asia 
The competence network Crossroads Asia derives its name from the geographical area extending from eastern Iran 
to western China and from the Aral Sea to northern India. The scholars collaborating in the competence network 
pursue a novel, ‘post-area studies’ approach, making thematic figurations and mobility the overarching 
perspectives of their research in Crossroads Asia. The concept of figuration implies that changes, minor or major, 
within one element of a constellation always affect the constellation as a whole; the network will test the value of 
this concept for understanding the complex structures framed by the cultural, political and socio-economic 
contexts in Crossroads Asia. Mobility is the other key concept for studying Crossroads Asia, which has always been 
a space of entangled interaction and communication, with human beings, ideas and commodities on the move 
across and beyond cultural, social and political borders. Figurations and mobility thus form the analytical frame of 
all three main thematic foci of our research: conflict, migration, and development. 
 
• Five sub-projects in the working group “Conflict” will focus upon specific localized conflict-figurations and 
their relation to structural changes, from the interplay of global politics, the erosion of statehood, and 
globalization effects from above and below, to local struggles for autonomy, urban-rural dynamics and 
phenomena of diaspora. To gain a deeper understanding of the rationales and dynamics of conflict in 
Crossroads Asia, the sub-projects aim to analyze the logics of the genesis and transformation of conflictual 
figurations, and to investigate autochthonous conceptions of, and modes of dealing with conflicts. 
Particular attention will be given to the interdependence of conflict(s) and mobility.  
• Six sub-projects in the working group “Migration” aim to map out trans-local figurations (networks and 
flows) within Crossroads Asia as well as figurations extending into both neighboring and distant areas 
(Arabian Peninsula, Russia, Europe, Australia, America). The main research question addresses how basic 
organizational and functional networks are structured, and how these structures affect what is on the 
move (people, commodities, ideas etc.). Conceptualizing empirical methods for mapping mobility and 
complex connectivities in trans-local spaces is a genuine desideratum. The aim of the working group is to 
refine the method of qualitative network analysis, which includes flows as well as their structures of 
operation, and to map mobility and explain mobility patterns. 
• In the “Development”-working group four sub-projects are focusing on the effects of spatial movements 
(flows) and interwoven networks at the micro level with regard to processes of long-term social change, 
and with a special focus on locally perceived livelihood opportunities and their potential for 
implementation. The four sub-projects focus on two fundamental aspects: first, on structural changes in 
processes of transformation of patterns of allocation and distribution of resources, which are contested 
both at the household level and between individual and government agents; secondly, on forms of social 
mobility, which may create new opportunities, but may also cause the persistence of social inequality. 
 
The competence network understands itself as a mediator between the academic study of Crossroads Asia and 
efforts to meet the high demand for information on this area in politics and the public. Findings of the project will 
feed back into academic teaching, research outside the limits of the competence network, and public relations 
efforts. Further information on Crossroads Asia is available at www.crossroads-asia.de.   
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